

THE IMPACT OF THE 1964
REVOLUTION
ON BRAZILIAN TELEVISION

By SÉRGIO MATTOS

PREFACE by
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SAN ANTONIO - TEXAS

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PREFACE

By Emile G. McAnany

This monograph by Sérgio Mattos serves as a model for communication research in the future. That future is increasingly international. At first glance, one might think the conclusions of the work show just the opposite, that Brazil is a case of a country that was both economically and culturally dependent before the military coup of 1964 and that by 1980 it had become independent in both its economy and its mass media content. At one level this is evident from both strong economic growth, industrialization and the increase of Brazilian made television programming by 1980. On the other hand, by this latter year Brazil was also more closely inserted into the world economic system of trade, both economically and culturally. Transnational corporations and especially transnational finance capital were still vital to continued economic growth, whatever the mix of state enterprise and private sector institutions within Brazil. The country continues (and must continue by the nature of the logic of the international economy into which it has become integrated) to push exports, whether industrial products, consumer goods or cultural items. By any of these standards, Brazil has followed a curious double path that Mr. Mattos describes so clearly, of both nationalism and dependency.

Mr. Mattos has performed an important service to communication scholarship by carefully documenting the growth of Brazilian television and the influence of the military regime on it during the important years since 1964. He shows that the military were clear from early on about what to do with this important mass medium. Their goals for television, the author points out, "were geared to accelerating order, progress, security and modernization, including strong state participation in the economy, friendliness to multinational investment, and development of basic conditions for national integration through the telecommunication system"(P.93). He shows that the basic goals of security and order were overriding so that at various times the military president of the country did not hesitate to use direct methods of censorship when it was deemed necessary. But the author also describes the technical and efficiency goals that the military regime promoted as well. These were manifested in an increasingly sophisticated and centralized (in the Ministry of Communications) apparatus that not only promoted a phenomenal growth of television stations but also a reinforcing social infrastructure of laws, regulations and institutions.

The author argues convincingly that the period 1964-1980 was a time of significant change and growth for television and the social infrastructure to make it technically efficient,

economically successful and increasingly self-sufficient in production. The conclusion that some might make, though the author is careful not to make it himself, is that the military government of Brazil was a nationalist, capitalist movement which has succeeded in showing how self-reliance can overcome the threats of what some have called the chronic dependency state of Latin America, both economically and culturally.

The economic health of television in Brazil has a great deal to do with the policies of the military, which promoted the “miracle” of 1969-1974. With increased consumer goods' production by both transnational and national enterprises, there was increased revenue for advertising and much of this flowed into television. But as the author indicates at the close of his study, much of this revenue comes through transnational firms and transnational advertising. This does not mean that Brazil has an economically independent (as opposed to a dependent) television system. Nor does increasing exports to other countries (it now exports its programs to some 50 countries worldwide) mean greater independence from forces that influence content.

Culturally the analysis the author provides is one of intriguing glimpses, but it has not been his purpose to analyze all of the factors that have created the cultural phenomenon that Brazilian television is today. He does point out that Brazilian television went through three distinct phases of content evolution: very early in its history when television was by the necessity of the technology a “live” medium, programs obviously were local; then during the 1960s and early 1970s it became a haven for US and other foreign series and films; finally, beginning in the early to mid-1970s, Brazil began to develop its own programs for prime time and to export them widely. The author points out that “as a result to recommendations, admonitions, criticism and suggestions from the government, television nationalized its programs, which today are typically Brazilian in treatment, theme and style”(p.96). I would suggest, however, that another equally important factor was that by the mid-1970s Brazilian television enterprises (especially the transnational financed Globo group) found it economically attractive to make their own programs for the growing internal market as well as looking for international markets.

It is true that Brazil's military promoted national cultural values, but always within their own vision of the good society, a society that was to be secure (militarily), prosperous (economically, within a capitalist framework) and moral (no violence or sex on the TV screens). What remains to be seen is whether this vision continues to promote a spontaneous participation of the Brazilian people as the regime planned. (Elections in the very near future are somewhat clouded by the seeming hesitation of the “abertura” to provide open elections by all parties.) The other aspect that is a task for communication scholars to pursue is whether the values of nationally made programs reflect more the culture of the Brazilian people at large or the demands of a television system heavily dependent on advertising and perhaps increasingly dependent on the export income of their programs to other peoples or cultures. Brazil is a

fascinating case and one that deserves close attention in the future. This work by Sérgio Mattos has marked the opening of this case but not the final word. We look forward to further work in this field by the author.

CONTENTS

Chapter

PREFACE – by Emile G. McAnany

INTRODUCTION

1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN TELEVISION
2. THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY REGIME ON TELEVISION
3. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMUNICATION LAWS AND REGULATORY AGENCIES ON THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION
4. POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION
5. SOCIOECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

NOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

LIST OF TABLES

1. BRAZILIAN TELEVISION STATIONS IN OPERATION
2. TELEVISION SETS PURCHASED IN BRAZIL
3. DISTRIBUTION OF RADIO AND TELEVISION CHANNELS ALONG THE BRAZILIAN BORDERS
4. BRAZILIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INSTITUTIONS
5. NUMBER OF TELEVISION STATION LICENSES BY PERIOD AND PRESIDENT
6. PROGRAM THEMES IN RIO DE JANEIRO
7. TELEVISION CONTENT, 1971
8. TELEVISION STATION LICENSES BY REGION
9. BRAZILIAN TELEVISION ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE

**The Impact of the 1964
Revolution
on Brazilian Television**

INTRODUCTION

The importance of television in the Brazilian context justifies a study of the medium because, since 1964, Brazilian television has been used by the military government to promote national development and national integration and has been used by many of Brazil's people as the only source of reference for their social interaction. Since its introduction in 1950 as a luxury consumer commodity, it has undergone several changes, which have contributed to the transformation of the medium into a complex social device. In Brazil, "even the very poor families think that television is a must." (1)

There is, however, a shortage of scholarly literature about Brazilian television. In fact, few original studies exist and those that do, deal with program content, soap operas, the audience, or a chronological history of the country's broadcast media. Too, most of the existing studies have resulted from research carried out in other countries and adapted to a Brazilian context, which includes approximately 20 million households with a television set, and a potential audience of 80 million. Because the fast growth of Brazilian television occurred after the coup d'état in 1964, from which a new political and socioeconomic order was established in Brazil and from which television benefited, I assumed that I could not examine the development of Brazilian television since 1964 without studying the military regime's objectives and its influence on all sectors of Brazilian society. This study tries to identify some of the effects of the military regime on the growth of Brazilian television during the period of time between 1964 and 1979. This study does not consider the recent promoted changes by President João Batista Figueiredo's administration. It will examine the regime's influence on the regulatory process and on political and socioeconomic development in order to outline a broad view of the development of Brazilian television within its present environment, as well as to serve as a framework for future research on the topic.

In 1964 the current authoritarian regime overthrew President João Goulart (1961-1964) and established its own development model. An investigation of Brazil's communications laws, of the regulatory agencies charged with enforcement, and political and socioeconomic influences on television, is, in reality, an investigation of the direct results of the military regime's actions in the political and socioeconomic spheres. It should be noted that, since 1964, the military has exerted direct or indirect influence on all sectors of

Brazilian society. As Wayne A. Selcher says,

Military, not civilian, groups are the president's principal constituency and have exercised considerable influence in recruitment of civilians to high administrative posts such as the cabinet. Military officers assume managerial and executive duties in a wide variety of government ministries, agencies, and corporations, either for security reasons (civil aviation, nuclear energy, oil, telecommunications steel, etc.) or because those agencies require technical competence in which the military excels. (2)

It is important to note that some of the military, political, economic, and social connections with television that this study finds can only be inferred or assumed from the available data. Because of this, I omitted much detail necessary to clarify certain evidence not only because this study is not a complete one, but also because many sources, such as broadcast enterprises and some official institutions did not provide answers to the questionnaires, which were sent to them. Despite these problems, this study points out some of the principal factors which have contributed to the technical improvement of Brazilian television and to how the government has influenced the content of television programming.

Research for this study was based on four main sources: presidential and ministerial speeches concerning television; laws and institutions, principally those related to telecommunications; studies dealing with Brazilian military structure and history, Brazilian socioeconomic history (principally the Brazilian "economic miracle"), the Brazilian process of urbanization and industrialization, and mass media communication, and network news publications, promotional booklets, and Brazilian newspapers and newsmagazines.

Chapter 1 provides a brief history of Brazilian television since its introduction in 1950. Chapter 2 explains the basic framework of the military structure and the doctrine on which the authoritarian regime has based its development model since 1964. Chapter 3 outlines communication policies and the principal regulatory agencies created after 1964 and how they have affected the growth of Brazilian television. Chapter 4 provides a view of how television has been affected by political actions. Chapter 5 points out socio-economic influences on the development of Brazilian television since 1950. It stresses the period after 1964, when the so-called Brazilian economic miracle, which contributed directly to the development of television, occurred. Chapter 6 provides a summary of the findings of this study and presents the future perspectives of Brazilian television.

1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF BRAZILIAN TELEVISION

Brazilian television was established on September 18, 1950, as an electronic toy for Brazilian elites. Using radio stars and primitive equipment, Brazilian television began broadcasting to an audience limited to 200 television sets. By the end of 1980, according to the calculations of the Electric and Electronic Association Industries of Brazil, there were more than 20 million TV-sets in the country(1). In 1980, there were 94 television stations broadcasting in Brazil (table 1) to a potential audience of more than 80 million Brazilians. "Almost 90 percent of Brazilian homes are within the range of television transmission."(2)

TABLE 1
Brazilian Television

Stations in Operation	
<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1975	68
1976	71
1977	71
1978	74
1979	94
1981	118(*)

(*) 106 TV stations are private
and 12 government-owned.

Source: SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the Ministry of Communications

In March 1979, The National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences of the United States gave the “Salute” trophy to the Globo Television networks, for its “excellent programming” and its contribution to television development. (3) It was the first international recognition of the importance and influence of Brazilian television, an industry that developed largely through a process of improvisation. In the same year one of TV Globo's programs, "O Sítio do Pica-pau Amarelo" ("The Yellow Woodpecker's Farm"), was chosen by UNESCO as an example of good children's programming. The program was shown to UNESCO's Assembly in Paris in 1979(4). A third testimonial to the technical quality of Brazilian television programs is the fact that "the Globo Network's serialized programs are presently being exported to 52 countries." (5)

The Elitist Origins of Brazilian Television

Brazilian television was established by Francisco de Assis Chateaubriand Bandeira de Mello, a journalist responsible for the creation of the Diários Associados Group, or Tupi Network. The first broadcast on Brazilian television was on September 18, 1950, in Sao Paulo, on TV Tupi, channel 3. It was the first television in South America. (6)

According to newspapers of the period, television was considered a “new powerful instrument.” The people, however, received it with skepticism. People joked about television sets, and made comments such as “do not touch this machine because it will cause an immediate explosion,” or “the man inside of the machine can see everyone in the house”.(7)

Brazilian television began in 1950 with only 200-television set, which belonged to members of the economic elite. The price of a television set was three times the price of the most-sophisticated phonograph (8). In addition, there were no industries to manufacture component parts of television sets in Brazil; even the tubes were made in North America. (9) By 1965, a Brazilian-made portable TV-set was being sold for approximately \$ 200.L0 All these factors limited the diffusion of television during the 1950s to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Nevertheless, a phenomenal rate of growth was established from the beginning (See table 2).

TABLE 2

TV Sets Purchased in Brazil

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number</u>
1950	200
1951	375
1954	12,000
1958	78,000
1965	3,000,000
1970	4,500,000
1972	6,500,000
1974	9,000,000
1977	10,000,000
1980(*)	20,000,000

Estimated Source:

Veja, no.107(1970); Prado 1973; Camargo 1975; Sodré 1977.

According to Gerald Thomas, television appeared in Brazil as an answer to an increasing demand for entertainment.

When television was born, cultural life was centered in Rio de Janeiro. The Copacabana Palace Hotel offered international stars and attracted all those who wished to gamble in “the least violent casinos in the world,” as a Brazilian travel brochure once described it. A government ban on gambling in the 1950’s encouraged the search for fresh diversions, at the very time when Brazil’s upper and middle classes were acutely aware that they lacked the latest symbol of technological achievement which their counterparts in the industrialized countries were enjoying. The establishment of television in Brazil thus answered a growing demand from these groups for new entertainment. (11)

However, since its beginning in Brazil, television has been a national government concession, operated

by private enterprises whose commercial interests are based on the philosophy of free enterprise. The Brazilian broadcast industry finds advertising to be its principal source of income. In the beginning, commercials were few in numbers and were limited to slide presentations. According to Muniz Sodré

in the beginning of Kubitschek's administration (1956-1961), there were not more than 250 thousand (sic) television sets in the country; by the end of the decade, that total was a little less than one million. In reality, television was an electrical appliance for a minority of producers as well as consumers. Due to the lack of economic efficiency, Brazilian TV stations produced a daytime television programming, which catered to the elite. (12)

He further argues that the absence of a commercial advertising structure and the early stations' focus on elite groups resulted in an overemphasis on certain types of programming. For example, in 1954, when the television set was still considered a luxury item, IBOPE (Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion, which performs audience measurement research in Brazil) reported that 48 percent of television owners had viewed a particular ballet performance. In 1958, however, in order to expand the size of their audiences, the broadcasting stations abandoned their cultural programs. (13)

In short, according to Gabriel Cohn, during the 1950s, Brazilian television was elitist, while Brazilian political life was marked by populism, but during part of the 1960s, Brazilian television adopted popular types of programs and the historical phase of populism was a thing of the past. (14)

The Populist Phase of Brazilian Television

The decade of the sixties was important to Brazilian television because it was during this decade that Brazil undertook the modernization of its communication systems and allowed the emergence of the networks. The National Code of Telecommunications, whose policies had been determined in 1962, was implemented in 1967 (see Chapter 3). After the 1964 coup d'état, many political, social, and economic events (for example, the founding of the Ministry of Communications in 1967 and the Brazilian economic miracle) contributed to the development of Brazilian television.

It was during the sixties that the video tape recorder began to be used in Brazil. Important world events, such as the trip to the moon, the presentation of the Oscars, Grand Prix auto racing, and the Olympics, were for the first time, broadcast directly to Brazil via satellite.

Brazilian television began to have an impact on a national scale and began to promote the sale of large quantities of goods. Indeed, people studying Brazilian television argue that one can only speak of a system of television in Brazil after 1967, when the country began centralizing its cultural and economic policies, and television networks were developing a strong economic base.

In January 1966, Television Age reported that in Brazil

TV advertising costs have risen sharply within the past year, yet business volume has increased within this same period by over 100 percent which suggests how necessary the medium has become. Newspaper and magazine readership, in the areas served by television, have declined but not the audience for radio, which has increased. Radio is still Brazil's greatest vehicle of communication. TV has taken over radio's prime evening time, of course, but between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. more people than ever before listen to radio (15).

~~It was during the 1960s that TV Tupi Network prospered.~~ According to Jeremy Tunstall, the Diários Associados Group, or TV Tupi Network was composed of “the prestige daily, 'O Jornal do Rio de Janeiro,' and 30 other newspapers, a chain of 18 television and 30 radio stations, its own news agency, advertising agency and public relations firms and several of Brazil's leading magazines - including 'O Cruzeiro' (modeled on Life) which, until 1967 was Latin America's biggest selling magazine.”(16) According to Thomas, TV Tupi Network -(Since 1971, TV Tupi Network was encountering serious financial difficulties. In July 1980, the Brazilian government decided to cancel Tupi's licenses. In March 1981, it was announced that new television broadcasting licenses had been awarded to Adolpho Bloch (TV Manchete) and Silvio Santos (SBT - Sistema Brasileiro de Televisão). Now Brazil has 5 television networks: Bandeirantes, Globo, Manchete, Record, and SBT. There are also some regional networks) - was powerful during the sixties and began to have serious competitors only in the late sixties, when

Brazilian TV viewers turned to politics, and ... TV Record, in particular, went in for both well-structured journalism and musical productions that had a striking impact on the country. Unlike TV Tupi, which leaned towards sensationalism and provincial entertainment, TV Record brought together Brazil's major singers and composers (of all political views), promoting musical programs where such figures as Chico Buarque and

Caetano Veloso became prominent again. ... Popular demands for democratic freedoms were widely expressed, not only in the mass demonstrations of the time, but also through lyrics that originated from TV-sponsored musical occasions. It was just a little earlier, in the mid-sixties, that TV Globo was launched. (17)

By the end of the sixties, Globo Network was concentrating its programs on the lower strata of the population and had gained a large audience. TV Globo maintained its policy of directing programs toward the lower strata of the population until approximately 1973. In that year it rethought all of its programs and productions, and sought a higher standard of technical quality, which would still retain the audience. Of this period, João Rodolfo do Prado says that, in response to the economic depression during the first three years of the military regime (from 1964 to 1967), “ TV Globo adopted films of long duration - a novelty in television - weeping soap operas and game shows”, in order to increase the audience and attract more advertisers. (18) Because of this, the size of the television audience increased while the frequency of movie theater attendance diminished considerably in Brazil.

This is not surprising when one considers that, after 1968, a television set could be bought with a small monthly payment, and that television reached the entire family. Television sets were relatively cheaper than theater ticket, bus or taxi fare, and the time lost in traveling from home to the theater.

This reality led Brazilian television to concentrate on programming for the low-income class. Brazilian networks came to rely more and more on local, popular programs and on canned films imported from the United States, which were cheaper than films produced in Brazil. By 1966, as reported by Television Age,

Programming has remained much the same for the past year-and-a-half. Soap operas and filmed American programs such as "Bonanza," "The Fugitive," "Virginian" and "Combat" are very popular. In the São Paulo area these two type programs hold the highest audience ratings. In the Rio area, Brazilian musical and comedy shows hold the highest ratings, then come the soap operas and the American filmed shows. Other than São Paulo, the audience ratings for the rest of Brazil follow closely those of Rio. (19)

By the end of the sixties, broadcasting stations were earning high profits, but were disregarding national culture. They introduced foreign cultural values, which were often at odds with local values (see Chapter 4). Urban-industrial class models from Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo were being imposed on all of Brazilian society.(20) The cultural domination exerted by the big urban centers in the late sixties is now recognized fact in Brazil and is evidenced by the location of the production centers of all commercial networks in Rio or São Paulo.

TV Globo Network

According to João Rodolfo do Prado; Brazilian television stations fall into three categories:

Those stations linked to one of the national commercial networks; those autonomous television stations, which produce programs themselves and are considered to be regional stations; and those official stations, which broadcast predominantly educational and cultural programs. (21) TV Globo, channel 4, the Brazilian television station which has attained the greatest success, was established in April 1965 by the journalist Roberto Marinho, as part of his newspaper and radio station conglomerate. Initially it received partial financial support from the Time-Life Corporation in the U.S. Tunstall says that “Globo television was set up with United States Time-Life money and personnel. The direct United States involvement was subsequently removed, but not before Globo had taken advantage of US money and management experience to achieve an extraordinary ascendancy for a single commercial company in the television of a nation the size of Brazil.” (22)

It should be pointed out that although the Brazilian constitution does not allow foreign ownership of the mass media (see Chapter 4), and although the contract between Globo and Time-Life had been denounced by congressmen, “Marinho's enterprise was a natural support to the government and the government (Castelo Branco, 1964-1967), in turn, was ready to help establish Globo. It was undoubtedly the richest TV station from its inception, and was not so dependent on the advertising revenue on which other stations relied so much.” (23)

João Calmon, who was president of ABERT (Brazilian Association of Radio and TV Enterprises) at the time of the "scandal" involving Globo and Time-Life, declared in an interview published in O Cruzeiro in 1967, that the competition between stations with only national capital and TV Globo, with its foreign capital, was a disloyal one. None of the television stations in operation in Brazil until 1967 had made investments of over 1 million dollars. Calmon, who was also the head of the Diários Associados Group or TV Tupi Network and one of the members of the Federal House of Representatives, also said that some of the stations of his network were established with an initial investment between 130 and 350 thousand dollars, whereas TV Globo had received 6 million dollars from Time-Life, without needing to pay interest like the others had had to do when they bought their equipment. (24)

Despite the lack of direct evidence, some Brazilian students of the mass media have pointed out a strange coincidence. Antônio F. Costella notes that President Castelo Branco enacted a Decree Law which added a new paragraph to Law No. 5,250 (see Chapter 4), by means of which foreign ownership of a mass medium was permitted. (25) It should be noted, however, that the existence of that decree was short-lived.

In this manner, as reported in 1965 by Television Age,

U.S. productions got a boost when TV Globo went on the air. “We’re using more canned American shows than the older stations”, a Globo producer said. “But we buy from all suppliers without favoritism. We mix detectives, westerns, musicals, whatever we think will attract sponsors and audiences”. TV Globo's canned imports in one recent week included “Novak”, “Mr.Ed”, “The Munsters”, “Rin-Tin-Tin”, “Andy Williams”, “Beverly Hillbillies”. U.S. shows are popular, but Brazilians do not identify with them, as they do “Right to be Born”, for example. As Brazilian producers grow more sophisticated and technical skills improve, U.S. distributors will be faced with a tough challenge to hold their share of the Brazilian market. (26)

According to a promotional booklet put out by TV Globo Network, the consolidation of Globo's national network policy was undertaken in 1969, when its nationwide news program began to be broadcast to and from different cities by microwave. That publication also talks about the development of Globo's programs:

While Globo was learning essential techniques and creating Brazil's own television style, it was also supplying itself with the most modern equipment available. The transition to 100 percent color production and transmission occurred during the five years from 1972 to 1977. Recognizing the necessity to maintain close ties with Brazilian culture and to express that culture on video, the Globo Network nationalized its programming to the extent that, presently, among the 10 programs of highest audience ratings, only two are of foreign origin. The remaining eight were created and produced in Brazil by the Globo Network. (27)

Muniz Sodré points out that in 1976 Globo Network produced 75 percent of its own programs and obtained approximately 18 percent of total advertising expenditure (see Chapter 5). (28) It should be noted that by law, the advertising time is limited to 15 minutes per hour. However, during prime time, Globo broadcasts only 9 to 12 commercial minutes per hour of airtime. (In April 1981, one-minute worth of advertising on “Baila Comigo” a top-rated soap opera in Brazil cost 40 thousand dollars).

In 1977 Globo Network made its debut in Cannes, France, when it presented a sample of its better programs to prospective customers. Having gained control of the internal market, Globo Network had begun to search for an international market, but its efforts to win its first international customers were, at the outset, stymied by technical problems. Brazil is the only country in the world that uses the color system PAL-M (a combination of German and American systems); all other countries use NTSC, PAL, or SECAN. In order to overcome these technical difficulties, Globo opened an office in London to

convert the system, insert new sound tracks, and translate the original dialogue from Portuguese to any target language. (29) Brazil, through the Globo network, has now exported programs of all types to different countries, among which are Angola, Bolivia, Chile, England, Italy, Honduras, Mexico, Oman, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, Trinidad, the United States and Yugoslavia (30) (It should be noted that Brazil's second largest television network, TV Bandeirantes, is also producing 70 percent of its own programs. In early 1981, it was creating a foreign department to export its programs).

In the United States, Globo's shows are on Spanish International Network. In 1980, Globo's success was subject of a 90-minute documentary "The Best of Brazilian Television") shown nationwide on the American Public Broadcasting Service. WNJU-TV and WXTV-TV in New York, which broadcast in Spanish, were two of Globo's first American customers. Spanish International Network broadcast Brazilian soap operas such as "O Bem Amado" ("The Well Beloved"), "Minha Doce Namorada" ("My Sweet Girlfriend"), "Irmãos Coragem"(The Brothers Coragem"). Globo also tapes soccer games in Brazil, which are frequently broadcast in the United States.(31) During the 1980 Marche International Des Programmes de Television (MIP-TV, in Cannes, TV Globo was selling eight major titles, including "Malu, Woman" 13 episodes of 50 minutes each. This series is about the daily routine of a divorced Brazilian woman, struggling against job discrimination, loneliness, and the challenge of a new lifestyle. This series was granted the 1980 Iris Award.

In short, according to Brazil em Dados-75 (Brazil's Statistics - 75), the TV Globo Network was in 1975 one of the 40 largest Brazilian enterprises and the ninth-largest commercial network in the world. (32) In 1981, TV Globo Network has become the fourth-largest network in the world, "topped in size only by the three American giants." (33) Also, in the same year, it was exporting to 83 countries.

THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY REGIME ON TELEVISION

On March 31, 1964, President João Goulart (1961-1964) was overthrown by a coup d'état that resulted from an alliance of civilian leaders and military officers. The immediate causes of the coup were political and economic decay. Since then, unlike the other Latin American dictator's styles of military rule, the Brazilian military regime has ruled as an institution. During this time, the military regime has promoted national development by means of the adoption of a new economic and political order based on the National Security Doctrine. According to Wayne A. Selcher, most of the philosophy which guides the revolutionary government is an intellectual result of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), or Higher War College, which has graduated many of the ministers of the military regime and at which both Presidents Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) served as instructors. (1)

This and succeeding chapters will discuss the role of Brazil's National Security Law and relate its functions to the socioeconomic and political situation and to its direct and indirect influences on the development of Brazilian television.

The Dissemination of ESG Doctrine and Objectives

The Escola Superior de Guerra was established and staffed by a small Brazilian military elite with the assistance of an American mission in 1948. The members of the Brazilian group, known as the "Sorbonne Group, "had fought alongside the United States Fourth Army in Italy as the Brazilian Expeditionary Force; ... has graduated at the top of the class at one of the three major army schools; and had attended foreign, mainly United States, schools." (2)

According to Thomas E. Weil, the ESG is engaged in the recruitment and training of a ruling elite." Its principal function is to prepare civilians and military to carry out executive or advisory functions on the formulation, development, planning, or execution of national policies (3). As

President Castelo Branco said in a press conference on May 14, 1964, the ESG had had an “‘extraordinary influence’ on those who had participated in it and had formed the revolutionary government. ... All who attended the school [ESG] became convinced that practical solutions to national problems should be completely divorced from partisan interests... . They had learned to work as a team, and they had ‘a global’ and a broad understanding of the problems of national security (4).

The ESG officially created by Decree No. 25,705 on October 22, 1948, is considered the first Brazilian institution to think about the doctrine which has been used by the military government since 1964.(5) _ Selcher states that the ESG was established along the general lines of the Nation-I War College in Washington (6), however, despite the initial assistance given by the U.S. War College, and despite the name borrowed from its American counterpart, the ESG - a permanent training center - developed its own doctrine ("Security and Development") concerning National Development and National Security (7). According to the ESG's concept, national security is "the relative degree of guarantee by political, economic, psychosocial, and military actions, that the state provides, at a given time, to the nation which it rules, for the realization of maintenance of the national objectives.(8)

For a long time, national security was considered from the standpoint of Brazil's defense against attack from outside; but after the promulgation of the Decree Law of Administrative Reform of March 1967, national security began to be defined in a broad sense, as the "guarantee of the achievement of the national objectives against internal or external opposition."(9)

In the section on internal security in the National Security Policy, various military, political, economic, and psychosocial objectives are stated (10). For example, in the military field the policy calls for the mobilization of armed forces in the national territory in order to take care of actual or imminent emergency situations, cooperation with undertakings linked to development and security, such as communications bridges, roads, railways, and social assistance. In the political field the policy calls for the improvement of the administrative process of the country, and the organization of the national congress and political parties in order to transform them into democratic institutions. In the economic field there is a call to reform the country's monetary and fiscal policies, to accelerate the formation of capital in order to invest it in sectors of the economic infrastructure, such as communications transportation, the steel industry, and energy, and to improve productivity. In the psychosocial field the policy promotes the fortification of the spiritual, moral, and civic values of the nation, the elaboration of an educational system adapted to Brazilian reality, and the use of systems of social communication in order to clarify public opinion concerning national problems and governmental actions to resolve them. This communication was to be made in an honest, impersonal, and legitimate manner, which would result

in growing importance of public relations organizations in all levels of activities.

The National Security Law closely follows the ESG's concept of national security in that the law pays particular attention to Brazil's system of communication, an important area in three of the four fields mentioned above. The military and psychosocial fields, which involve the process of communication (to clarify public opinion and to integrate national territory) are the most important to this study. It should be noted that the Decree-Law of Administrative Reform, signed by President Castelo Branco in 1967, is concerned with internal security at the federal level. The connections among ESG, the National Security Law, and the systems of communication will be more clearly shown in the rest of this chapter, but, for clarity, it should be noted that,

the ESG, however, does not make security policy nor does it have the last word on evolution of the doctrine. Its function is one of research and suggestion to the president and the highest executive agencies, including the Armed Forces general staff, which may take its recommendations or options into account in their decisions. The agency most responsible for making national security policy has been the National Security Council, composed of the President, Vice-President, all cabinet ministers, the heads of the civil and military cabinets and of National Intelligence Service, the chief of Armed Forces general staff, and the chiefs of staff of each of the three Army, Navy, and Air Force service branches. [The National Security Council is composed of 26 persons](11).

The ESG itself does not rule Brazil, but its influence and ideology stress nationalism and, thus, the necessity for a strong central government. Despite the fact that ESG disclaimed any involvement in the government after 1964, according to Barry Ames,

At the time of the coup, three groups comprised the anti-Goulart forces: Castelo Branco and officers and civilians technicians associated with ... the ESG, civilians politicians, and non-ESG officers. The Castelo Branco regime was soon dominated by the ESG group. Civilian politicians like Adhemar de Barros and Carlos Lacerda lost their political influence. Generals sympathetic to the coup but not to the ESG were purged, including Olympio

Mourão Filho and Amaury Krueel. The dominance of post-coup policymaking by officers and civilians with essentially ESG goals was facilitated by heavy civilian participation in the Escola. (12)

An example of the indirect involvement of the ESG in the affairs of government after 1964 by means of civilian participation is the fact that during Emílio Garrastazu Médici's term in office (1969-1974) seven civilian cabinet ministers were graduates of the ESG. (13)

The ESG was always directly or indirectly involved in the revolutionary government. For example, Castelo Branco, the first president of the military regime, was an instructor and director of studies of the ESG; General Golbery do Couto e Silva, considered the intellectual of the movement, was the first head of the National Information Service (14), and continued to work closely with Presidents Médici, Geisel, and until mid-1981 with João Batista Figueiredo as a member of the civil cabinet. The concept of national security was spread in Brazil principally by General Golbery do Couto e Silva. (15)

The Objectives of the National Security Council and of the ESG

The National Security Council (NSC) is the institution that determines national objectives. The president of Brazil is the chairman of this council, which operates as a top-level agency in order to understand how the Doctrine of National Security is transformed into policy, one must examine the objectives of the Escola Superior de Guerra. According to Selcher, the six objectives of the ESG are (1) national integration; (2) sovereignty; (3) development, progress, and national prosperity; (4) democracy; (5) territorial integrity; and (6) social peace. (16) General Carlos de Meira Mattos, however, in his essay entitled “Revolutionary Doctrine Policy” (“Doutrina Política Revolucionária”), published in the magazine of the Military Club in 1970, says that the revolutionary movement's doctrine presents nine national objectives within three classifications: (1) critical objectives, including national integration, and national prosperity; (2) objectives to be defended, including democracy, the moral and spiritual values of the nation, and social peace; (3) objectives to be preserved, including independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international prestige.(17)

This study will limit itself to a discussion of those points in the above which are directly or indirectly related to the system of communication in general or with telecommunications in particular; that is, national integration, territorial integrity, preservation of the moral and spiritual values of the nation, and social peace.

National Development and Security

As has been shown, the promotion of national development by the revolutionary movement of 1964 has been based on the National Security Doctrine, which has its basis in the ESG's national objectives. Only four of the nine objectives are directly related to the subject of this study, and it must be clarified that here those objectives were considered as being related to and dependent on each other in relation to the communications system. In order to show this relationship, each one of the four selected objectives will be briefly discussed in this section.

The objectives of national integration and territorial integrity have the same goal, that is, national unity. National integration consists of a set of programs designed to increase both societal and spatial integration and to diminish regional diversities by promoting, among other things, economic development, a more stable political system, internal cohesion, and national spirit. As Selcher says, "Government planners are seeking national unity through the creation of national consciousness within a political and economic community linked by a value consensus on the advantages of progress and modernization."⁽¹⁸⁾ He also claims that the achievement of this goal involves transportation, communication, and settlement. It should be noted that the Northeast and the Amazon regions have received special treatment since 1964. In the Amazon, development has been promoted by the Armed Forces by means of the establishment of communications networks, the teaching of agricultural techniques, the construction of bridges and roads, and the provision of transportation and security, for example.

Territorial integrity is related to surveillance in the coastal zone and along Brazil's borders with other countries. It is connected to the National Plan of Telecommunications, which can also be considered as important in the maintenance of territorial integrity and national integration by means of the strategic distribution of radio and television stations along Brazilian frontiers. Table 3 shows the distribution of radio and TV stations throughout the ten Brazilian Border States. (See also "The Future of Brazilian Television" in Chapter 6).

The social peace objective, one of the most studied topics in the ESG during 1962, appeared in response to the economic and political crises during Goulart's term in office. The National Security Council sees social peace as necessary to economic growth, one of the goals of the regime.

TABLE 3
Distribution of Radio and TV Channels
Along the Brazilian Borders

State	Operative Channels		Stations Planned but Not Yet Established	
	<u>Radio</u>	<u>TV</u>	<u>Radio</u>	<u>TV</u>
Acre	5	1	26	16
Amapá	5	1	12	4
Amazonas	4	-	26	8
Mato Grosso	21	1	30	8
Pará	2	-	3	3
Paraná	44	4	30	19
Rio Grande do Sul	71	7	41	40
Rondônia	8	1	8	3
Roraima	2	1	11	2
Santa Catarina	13	1	5	-
Total	175	17	192	103

Source: SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the Ministry of Communications. These data are from February 1980. These 10 states contain 263 cities and are considered to be in the frontier of Brazil.

In his analysis of this theme, Selcher says that

Social peace means not only the avoidance of political violence and disruption, such as in the 1967-72 fight against terrorists, but also contained social change, uninterrupted production, strong social organization and discipline with moralistic overtones, and stress on traditional values. Administration takes precedence over politics. This is all maintained via incontrovertible, supposedly apolitical motives equated with patriotism and non-subservience to any subnational interest. (19)

As can be easily seen, the fourth point, the preservation of the nation's moral and spiritual values, has a lot in common with social peace: both concern moral values.

The Military Regime's Goals through Mass Media

Among other things, the revolutionary movement occurred in order to promote a **new** social and development order by means of a national building program. Initially the new regime undertook a policy of decentralized incentives to reduce the inequality in living conditions and socioeconomic development among regions and between city and hinterland (see Chapter 5).

That policy also required the building of a national spirit based on the preservation of Brazilian beliefs, culture, and values. In order to achieve these goals, the military regime needed a means of disseminating the ideas of the new order, that is, the revolutionary movement's aspirations and concepts of development, peace, and integrity. The mass media became the means by which the movement could persuade, impose, and spread its positions in order to maintain the post coup status quo.

It is important to understand the ESG's concept of communication. According to the Brazilian Higher War College, communication is the process by which human relations exist and develop. Moreover, the ESG states that communication is the process of transmitting something in order to exert a conscious influence on the receiver of the communication, whose reaction will affect the starting point, that is, the sender of the message (20). The military regime, basing its actions on a doctrine of "security and development", (21) is responsible for the establishment of such institutions as the Ministry of Communication, the National Department of Telecommunications (Dentel), the Brazilian Telecommunications Enterprise (Embratel), the National Communication Council, and of many laws and decrees that contributed to the development of the basic structure necessary for the socioeconomic, political, and cultural development of the country in general terms, and of telecommunications in particular.

By creating operational conditions for Brazilian telecommunications (principally for the telephone system) - access to microwave networks, coaxial cables, satellites, and color television, for example - the military regime contributed to the technical development of television and used it to promote the ideas of the regime. As a case in point, President Médici gained political advantage from the national euphoria resulting from Brazil's triumph in the World Soccer Cup in Mexico in 1970. At this time, a national campaign broadcast many slogans which helped to transform the Médici administration (one of the most repressive) into one of the most popular of the revolutionary movement.(22)

However, it was during Presidents Médici and Geisel's terms in office (from 1969 to 1979) that Brazilian television was most directly influenced by the government, which, in addition to furthering television's technical development, began to be concerned about program content. It was during this

period that the sweeping Institutional Act No.5, of December 13, 1968, was used to cancel electoral mandates, to suspend habeas corpus, to decree federal interventions without constitutional safeguards, and to impose strict censorship, primarily on television and radio stations.

Thus, it can be said that in Brazil the short and long-term actions of the military regime to accelerate order, progress, security, and modernization (actions which included strong state participation in the economy, friendliness to multinational investors, development of conditions to national integration by means of the telecommunication system) contributed, directly and indirectly, to the development of Brazilian television. The fact that this medium, in turn, has benefited from the social, political and economic situation of the 1964-1980 period is proven by its considerable development, both technically and qualitatively, during that time span. This development has been principally because the government was concerned about the content and quality of television programming and therefore created conditions necessary for that development.

The military regime's influence on the development of television will be discussed in the following chapters from the points-of-view of communication policy, and the economic and political situations which were imposed or came about as a consequence of the actions of the government. It was during Médici's term in office that the so-called Brazilian Economic Miracle occurred, and it was during the same period that the government also began to be concerned with the content and production of television programming.

**THE INFLUENCE OF
COMMUNICATION LAWS AND
REGULATORY AGENCIES ON
THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION**

From the establishment of radio in Brazil until the present, communications policies have been adapted primarily to the political ideologies which are held by the executive power. Sometimes specific laws were reformulated by the addition of new articles or decrees, and sometimes-existing laws were replaced by new laws that better expressed the needs and values of the dominant political regime.

Brazilian communication policy is composed of various laws, decrees, official recommendations and suggestions, many of which are not yet codified. This chapter, therefore, does not pretend to present a complete analysis of Brazilian broadcast legislation, but focuses strongly on some of the communication institutions - for example, the Ministry of Communications, Embratel, and Dentel (see Table 4)

TABLE 4
Brazilian Telecommunications institutions

Institution	Year Authorized	Enabling Legislation	Year Established
Contel *	1962	Law no.4,117	1962
Embratel	1962	Law no.4,117	1965
Dentel	1965	Decree no.55,625	1965
Ministry of Communications	1967	Decree law no.200	1967
Telebrás	1972	Decree no. 70,914	1975
Radiobrás	1975	Law no. 6,301	1975

Contel was disbanded in 1972 and reestablished in 1976 as the Conselho Nacional de Comunicação, CNC.

These institutions were established by the military regime to support domestic communications industries and to create the basic infrastructure necessary to promote development and national integration and to link the northern and southern, as well as the eastern and western regions of the country by means of the telecommunications system.

Since the military government has played an active role in the development and regulation of the mass media, it is important to note that since 1964 “the Law of Information (Law of the Press), the National Code of Telecommunications and the Law of National Security are the main legal parameters by which decisions about mass media operations and the flow of information are taken.”(1) However, besides these laws, the National Constitution and the Institutional Acts have played an important role in the Brazilian context since 1964. Between 1968 and 1979, the mass media operated under the restrictions of Institutional Act No.5. The censorship powers granted the Federal Executive Board by the Act resulted in increased self-censorship among the media in cases where publication of certain material could conceivably lead to prosecution under the Law of National Security.

The Institutional Act No.5 was extensively used from 1968 to 1979, during which time the Brazilian people and institutions (including television) were under the pressure of strict censorship.(2) The statements of high government officials, such as Colonel Toledo Camargo give an idea of the regime's concept and justification of censorship of radio and television: “These media have such a tremendous impact, such a tremendous power to influence public opinion, that a special policy towards them is essential.” (3)

In order to present a realistic view of the regulatory process, which controls the behavior of the Brazilian broadcast system, it should be divided roughly into two periods: before, and after the coup of 1964.

Broadcast Regulation

before 1964

Brazilian broadcast regulations have evolved from specific laws, which ruled radio, to the Brazilian Code of Broadcast, which was changed by the revolutionary regime to the National Code of Telecommunications. According to Nely Camargo, "the first law passed in Brazil (1821) was concerned with freedom of thought, and movement and individual rights and guarantees. The freedom of the press,

which was the only mass medium at the time of independence, was thus assured at the time of the formation of the Brazilian State. To preserve it has been a constant concern in everyday sociopolitical life.(4)

In 1917, by means of Decree no.3,296, the federal government stated its intention to control and run the radio, telegraphic, and radiotelephonic services. Since its advent, the broadcast system in Brazil has been considered a public service over which the state can exert control. (5) However, it can be run by private enterprises operating under government concessions.

The first regulation designed to govern the behavior of commercial broadcasts in Brazil was passed nine years after the establishment of the first radio station (in Rio de Janeiro on September 7, 1922). (6) Decree no. 20,047, which became law on May 27, 1931, preserved the power of the state to pass legislation concerning the broadcast services, which were considered to be in the national interest and which had education as their primary goal.

On March 1, 1932, decree no. 21,111 was enacted as a complement to no. 20,047. It defined the nature of broadcast services within the national territory and established a licensing procedure. It also enumerated the rights and duties of the enterprises, as well as the sanctions that could be imposed by the government against those enterprises.

On September 7, 1934, decree no. 24,655 was enacted in order to complete the procedures begun by the first two decrees. The government stated in that decree that it would invalidate the licenses of any enterprises, which were not following the rules. In response to that threat, the Paulista Federation of Radio Societies was created in 1934. This association had as its primary objectives the promotion of a review of the first two decrees, and the diminution of the control exerted by all three on broadcast activities.

Between 1940 and 1953, many projects were suggested by the broadcasters, who were trying to establish a Brazilian Code of Broadcast by means of which they could minimize the degree of control imposed by regulations. However, all attempts to change the content of those decrees failed; in effect nothing was changed.

The Brazilian Code of Telecommunications was established in 1962 as a result of the discussion of Bill no.36, which was presented in the Senate in 1953 by Senator Marcondes Filho. Between 1953 and 1962, the bill underwent countless changes in both the federal House of Representatives and the Senate. Those changes were made because Bill no. 36 was an elaboration of the conclusions presented at the 1953 Congress of Broadcasters in São Paulo and had as its purpose the elimination of all governmental control or influence on the broadcast system.

After nine years of discussion and changes, Bill no.36 was transformed into Law no. 4,117 of 1962, under which the National Council of Telecommunications (Contel) was created. According to Nely Camargo,

Contel, as a regulatory body, supervises the activities of government-granted concessions, issues authorizations and permits for the use of telecommunications services and applies penalties. Any technical or hardware supplies contract of radio and television enterprises with foreign organizations is subject to approval by the National Council of Telecommunications (Contel). The law forbids any contractual arrangement with foreign enterprises, which imply the right of direct or indirect participation on the profits of Brazilian mass media, enterprises. (7)

Broadcast Regulations

after 1964

There is much evidence that communication policy contributed to the growth of Brazilian television. Governmental regulatory agencies after the coup of 1964 created the necessary infrastructure with regard to the technical, economic, and social development of television. At the time, the military regime, through the exertion of censorship, deprived the public of much information, in the name of national security. In addition, Nely Camargo says that,

By law, censorship may be exerted over the mass media and news agencies by the government during a period of siege, on matters related to motives of the siege and by the persons legally authorized to exert it. The motives that can determine the siege are specified by the 1967 Constitution (Article 152). Censorship is also exerted upon public shows and entertainment. A law of 1970 (no.1077, January) establishes censorship in matters of ethical and moral patterns for national or foreign publications and shows, which are to be submitted to the Ministry of Justice. (8)

As noted in Chapter 2, since 1964 the military governments have been ruling under the National Security Doctrine in order to accelerate the modernization of the country. (9) Thus, since 1964 the government has made extensive use of the broadcast media to instill in the public a sense of participation in the modernization process. The Brazilian people have been informed of governmental actions and have been called to participate in national programs by means of many advertising campaigns, which have been broadcast on radio and television.

Consequently, it can be inferred that communications policies were established in order to maintain the post revolutionary status quo in Brazil. The fact that broadcasting is conducted by means of the concession of licenses reinforces the idea of the maintenance of the existing states of the military regime's

affairs. Elihu Katz and George Wedell maintain that

Television-operating licenses tended to be granted to wealthy government supporters who would take a friendly attitude toward the politicians. Concentration of ownership is also a feature of television broadcasting, but in all South American countries governments are more involved in television than they are in radio. This is particularly true in Peru and Brazil where governments are increasingly moving toward formulation of integrated communications policies. (10)

The Brazilian Press Law

There are three basic laws by means of which the government supervises Brazilian television (Press Law, National Security Law, and National Code of Telecommunications). Gordon Campbell says of these laws that

the preparations for assumptions of power by the Costa e Silva [the second president of the revolutionary movement] administration were completed by two major pieces of legislation, the National Security and Press Laws. ... The Press Law enacted in February [1967] was criticized by the Brazilian press, radio, and television, which undertook a national campaign in protest and even mobilized support for their case from international associations of journalists. The Security Law, which was generally considered to represent the views on national problems of the War College were, similarly, ill received. It included among other things, powers to inflict stiff penalties on those trying to subvert the "politicossocial" order, to promote strikes in the public services or to publish false or tendentious news that would endanger the prestige or credit of Brazil. The combination of these two laws with the new constitution appeared to vest a formidable concentration of powers in the future President.(11)

Despite its name, the Press Law also comprises regulations regarding radio and television. The Press Law is divided into seven chapters" the first concerns freedom of thought; the second, the registration of mass media enterprises; the third, abuses of freedom; the fourth, the right of response; the fifth, criminal procedures and responsibilities; the sixth, civil responsibilities; and the last chapter deals with other provisions of the law.

Sometimes there is more than one law for the same point. For example, both the Press Law and the

Constitution rule on the ownership (direct or indirect) of mass media enterprises (political or informative) in Brazil and clearly state that such ownership is reserved for Brazilians.

President Castelo Branco enacted a decree-law, which added a new paragraph to the third Article of Law no. 5,250, under which foreign ownership of mass media was permitted, at the same time that the "scandal" involving Time-Life and TV Globo began to be discussed throughout the country. The decree law was presumably short-lived, because on March 13, 1967, a new National Security Law was promulgated and the press (print, radio, and television) came under the new Security Law (see the Time-Life and TV Globo discussion in Chapter 1). (12)

The National Code of

Telecommunications

Brazilian television is primarily a private activity that has a tendency to form cultural conglomerates without any legal restrictions. In Brazil, television networks are generally associated with newspapers or other kinds of organizations involved with mass communication. The best example of these multi-media enterprises in Brazil is the Globo organization.

Besides the newspaper, O Globo, the Globo organization is composed of the Globo Radio System (17 stations); Rio Gráfica Editora S.A. (the Rio Graphics Publishing Company, Inc.); SIGLA (Globo Audio-Visual Recording System, Ltd.); Telcom (a telecommunications industry); Vasglo (an entertainment promotions business); the Galeria de Arte Global (Global Art Gallery); TVC (cable television); the Roberto Marinho Foundation; and the Globo Television Network (five owned-and-operated television stations linked to 30 relay stations). In the mid-1979, the Globo Television Network had 36 affiliated TV stations in principal Brazilian cities. (13)

Regardless of the fact that Brazilian television networks are private enterprises, they operate the channels under concession from the federal government. Because of this, they must observe the rules of the political game in order to keep their licenses. However, even if an enterprise has observed all regulations, it can be punished for other things; for example, it may be singled out for its political or ideological positions.

Reprisals can vary from economic punishment to cancellation of the license. For example, TV Excelsior Network, which had been a powerful group during Goulart's term in office, lost its license on October 1, 1970. The principal reason given by Dentel (the regulatory agency) to justify the cancellation of the license was Excelsior's financial insolvency. (14)

It can be inferred that the group may have been subjected to economic pressure before the

cancellation of the licenses due to its connections with Goulart's administration. TV Excelsior's decline - between 1964 and 1970- coincides with the ascendant period of TV Globo, which directly benefited from the Revolution of 1964.

In order to understand Brazilian communication policies, one must bear in mind that legal ownership of radio and television services is ultimately in the hands of the federal government. Because of the high level of public interest in radio and television, the federal government reserves the right, whenever justifiable, to modify regulations and by-laws, as well as the terms of individual concessions. (15) Thus, under the National Code of Telecommunications, which was modified in 1967, both television and radio services have to have educational and cultural objectives. Because of this, the code rules that stations must broadcast a minimum of 5 hours per week of educational programs. Moreover, they must reserve at least 5 percent of their total on-air time for news broadcasts. (16)

Licenses for television channels are granted for 15 years. Assuming that the concessionaire has observed the rules and accomplished all legal and contractual duties, a license may be renewed for another fifteen years. However, the concessionaire's technical, financial, and moral suitability must not change during the licensed period, and the concessionaire must maintain the "public interest".

In order to prevent the formation of a monopoly, according to Decree law no.236, of February 28, 1967 (which completed and modified Law no.4, 117, of August 1962), each entity is limited as to the total number of television stations it may run. Each communication enterprise may own a total of 10 stations, owned-and-operated, in all of the national territory. Of that total, only 5 may be VHF. The same decree also limits each group to a maximum of 2 stations per state. (17)

Decree law no. 236 shows a strong involvement of the military regime in mass media communications. Law no.236 enhanced the values and objectives of the new government, and, at the same time, changed and adapted Law no. 4, 117, which had encompassed the first code of telecommunications and Contel. Katz and Wedell state that

the severity of the penalties for infringement of the law increased, and the concentration of power by local and, particularly, foreign interests was also restricted. The law prohibited all types of foreign technical assistance that might permit "intervention or knowledge of the administrative life or the orientation of the broadcasting organization" and limited the number of stations that might be owned by commercial organization. (18)

The Ministry of Communications and the Brazilian Association of Radio and Television Enterprises (ABERT), jointly elaborated a new code in 1974 in which the mass media were considered as a means to be used for furthering national development and national security. (19)

Therefore, by law, commercial broadcast enterprises must always be at the disposal of the

authorities in order to broadcast announcements which are within the scope of national security. Also, they may all be requested, at any time and free of charge, to broadcast presidential or ministerial speeches under the direction of the National Agency of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic. (20)

The Ministry of Communications

The Ministry of Communications was established in 1967 in order to centralize the national system of communications under direct governmental supervision. (21) Its establishment contributed to the reduction of power of some broadcasting regulatory agencies to which the broadcast enterprises had had easier access. The Ministry of Communications thus contributed to the reduction of influence of private organizations over regulatory agencies (22).

If one considers the military regime's national objectives (see Chapter 2), an argument posited by Herbert I. Schiller can be applied to the Brazilian case as an explanation of the centralization of the system) that is, that "the control of communications is generally a primary step in the acquisition of political authority... Telecommunications are today the most dynamic forces affecting not only the ideological but also the material bases of society". (23)

Thus, from 1967, with the creation of this Ministry, the Brazilian telecommunications system began to undergo a total reformation in order to reach national integration. Regional plans were integrated within the national plan of communications in all fields to facilitate a uniform and national growth of the sector, to avoid the use of nonstandard equipment, and to eliminate other technical problems. (24)

The objectives of the Ministry of Communications may be summarized from a lecture given in 1976 by Minister of Communications Euclides Quandt de Oliveira in the Escola Superior de Guerra: (1) to establish goals for the national system of communications; (2) to promote the establishment of the communication media in order to achieve national security; (3) to promote research and training in order to supply the needs of the sector; (4) to verify the modernization of the technical management of each sector; (5) to promote the compatibility of the industrial sector with the expansion plans of the communications services; (6) to support the national telecommunications industry; (7) to consolidate the establishment of the National System of Communications via satellite until 1983, by offering the means to establish the national distribution of TV to four simultaneous channels, and by offering communications facilities to supply the needs of the national security services; and (8) to consolidate, actualize, and complete the legislation.(25)

In short, the initial development of Brazilian television was irregular. With the creation of the Ministry of Communications, the formulation of a national communication policy, and the creation of new official organizations (Embratel, Dentel, Radiobrás) the technical development of Brazilian television, and the "good taste" of program content were stimulated.

The Brazilian Telecommunications

Enterprise (Embratel)

Embratel, which was authorized in 1962, was not established until 1965. Its initial responsibility was the setting up and operating of the national system of telecommunications. Embratel was responsible for transmission, emission, or reception of signals, images, sound, or information of any nature, by wire, radio, electricity, optical means, or any other electromagnetic process. In 1967 Embratel began to be absorbed by the Ministry of Communications, and since 1972 has been a subsidiary of Brazilian Telecommunications (Telebrás) (26). Telebrás was created in 1972 for the purpose of centralizing and coordinating telecommunications in Brazil. In order to develop the national telecommunications systems, Telebrás has, among its other accomplishments, carried out a project called National System of Communication via Satellite, which has been incorporated into the National Plan of Telecommunications. (27)

The three basic programs of Embratel are (1) to provide the country's telecommunications Infrastructure; (2) to facilitate Brazil's participation in the International Telecommunications System; and (3) to permit a high quality of telecommunication services, such as live transmissions of national and international programs, international and national direct telephone dialing, telegraphy, radiograms, radio transmissions, data processing, data processing centers and terminals throughout the national territory. (28)

After 1967, Embratel, following national security concepts, created the conditions necessary for the development of Brazil's telecommunications system, and created alternatives for the same services. Communication can now be processed in Brazil via microwave network, satellite, or submarine cable.

Because Embratel bought approximately \$10 million worth of new stock in 1976, Brazil is presently the fourth-largest stockholder in the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat).(29) According to Nely Camargo, the "financial resource for Embratel come from the national telecommunications fund, constituted by the government-owned Brazilian Telephonic Company (CTB), television transmissions for the generating television commercial stations and interstate telephone operations. (30)

In 1976, according to Embratel, Brazilian television transmitted via satellite to other countries 34 hours and 30 minutes of programs and received 325 hours and 48 minutes of live programs. According to Embratel, the difference between the number of hours of television programs transmitted and the number received in 1976 was attributable to the Olympic games held in Montreal. (31)

Embratel is one of the government enterprises that have contributed to national integration and development in accordance with national security concepts. At the same time, Embratel has also allowed television growth by expanding the national telecommunication industry, and by helping and stimulating the Brazilian networks to link the country by means of national television programs whose production is centralized in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

National Department of Telecommunications

In 1967, the Ministry of Communications absorbed the National Telecommunications Council (Contel), which was transformed into an organization in which the national Telecommunications policies were elaborated. In 1972, the National Department of Telecommunications (Dentel) assumed all responsibilities of Contel. (32)

From the administrative point of view, the objectives of Dentel are (1) to exploit, directly and indirectly, the basic services that integrate the national telecommunication system and its international connections; (2) to grant licenses to broadcast enterprises, as well as to inspect telecommunications concessionaires, and to apply legal and specific sanctions; (3) to supervise the expansion of public services such as telegraphy, telephony, radiocommunications, and telecommunications; (4) to stimulate the development of the telecommunication equipment industry, and give preference to those that are controlled by Brazilian stockholders; and (5) to review the international and national contracts of concessions of services.

Brazilian Broadcast

Enterprise (Radiobrás)

In the presidential message of 1976 to the National Congress, President Ernesto Geisel officially announced the objectives of Radiobrás. Geisel said that Radiobrás (established by Law no.6, 301, December 15, 1975) was created with the basic objective of promoting better utilization of the broadcast enterprises operated directly by the government. According to Geisel, Radiobrás would create and install stations at strategic points in the national territory in order to facilitate national integration. (33)

One year later, in another message addressed to the National Congress, President Geisel stated that Radiobrás programs had placed emphasis on the preservation of Brazilian culture. (34) Moreover, the president said that Radiobrás had begun an international program in order to disseminate Brazilian art and culture abroad (35).

Thus, the Brazilian military regime created its own radio and television network in order to offer alternatives to audiences, to promote national integration, and to preserve Brazilian culture in accordance with the national objectives set up by both the ESG and the National Security Council. In addition, Radiobrás was created in order to

eliminate the shortcomings of commercial broadcasting in supplying broadcasting services to all regions of the country and to coordinate the efforts of educational stations. Although this plan [to establish state-owned radio and TV stations] has increased the anxiety over nationalization among the private operators. Officials in Brasilia and Rio have declared that their intention is to supplement the existing structure rather than to compete with it. (36)

By the time Radiobrás was created, the network under federal administration was composed of 54 radio transmitters (31 medium wave, 18 short wave, and 5 FM), and 4 television stations. (37)

Thus, one can infer that, in reality, the broadcast enterprises have been directly affected by regulation. In the specific case of Brazilian television, since the military regime's takeover in 1964, to 1979 (from Castelo to Geisel), television has directly and indirectly benefited from the political, social, and economic actions of the federal government. These encompass not only communication policies but also all other regulations and isolated actions. The government has also influenced the mass media by

means of support for bank loans to progovernment media, by facilitated importation of electronic equipment, and by the placement of official advertising on progovernment media.

POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION

This chapter will identify how television has been influenced by the political situation in Brazil, and will concentrate its attention on the Médici (1969-1974) and Geisel (1974-1979) administrations.

The broadcast media in Brazil have been influenced and used by such political leaders as President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945; 1951-1954), and by the presidents following the revolutionary movement of 1964, such as President Emílio Médici. (1) Getúlio Vargas, who, by means of a coup d'état in 1937, established a dictatorial regime, used radio to facilitate his political career.(2) At that time the social and political situation was controlled with strong censorship. Since 1964, however, both radio and television have been used by the military regime as a tool for its political, economic, and social purposes, in accordance with the National Security Council's objectives (discussed in chapter 2).

Brazilian Political

Characteristics

This section summarizes the principal characteristics of the political system in Brazil after the Second World War. (3) Thus, in order to facilitate a better understanding of the political situation, I divided it into two periods, the 1946-1964 period, and the 1964-1979 period. According to the military regime's spokesmen, everything that has been done in this second period has, among other things', been aimed at the restoration of democracy and the salvation of Brazil from “communism, corruption and chaos.” (4)

According to the classification developed by José Odelso Schneider, the first period was a liberal one characterized by: (1) liberal democracy with a presidential regime; (2) multiple political parties; (3) political instability and administrative corruption; (4) industrial expansion; (5) occupation of the national territory starting with the construction of Brasilia; and elaboration of the first plans of economic regional

development (which were not realized because of the lack of administrative continuity).

The second period, from 1964 to 1979, was a period characterized by: (1) technocratic-military government; (2) concentration of power in the executive branch; (3) emphasis on an ambitious national plan of economic development; (4) reduction of the number of political parties to only two; (5) the National Security Council as the moderator. ⁵ The second period of Brazilian politics can be further divided into three phases: (1) the 1964-1967 period, in which emphasis was given to the economic-capitalist and institutional reorganization; (2) the 1968-1973 period, which was characterized by fast growth and by efforts to promote national integration; and (3) the 1974-1977 period which was considered a transition phase in the economic readaptation related to the world-wide energy crisis, as well as in relation to the new stage of industrial development.⁽⁶⁾ According to Brazil: 14 anos de revolução, this last stage could be prolonged. ⁽⁷⁾

The Proliferation

of TV Stations

Brazilian TV has undergone several transformations since its beginning, in which technological, economic, social, and political changes have contributed directly or indirectly to its growth.

According to José Marques de Melo, the initial growth of Brazilian television may be attributed to political favoritism, which called for the concession of television channels without any preconceived plan.⁽⁸⁾ In this sense, the proliferation of Brazilian TV stations has paralleled television growth in numerous other countries.

The proliferation of television stations began before the military regime's takeover, during the administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek. After the establishment of the Ministry of Communications in 1967, television channel licensing began to take into account not only national necessities but also the National Security Council's objectives of national development and integration. Table 5 shows the concessions of television channels in Brazil between 1955 and 1979.

During Kubitschek's term in office, Brazil underwent a period of optimistic development. Television represented progress so businessmen made investments without any serious consideration of the social, economic, or political implications of the new medium.

During the first four years of the sixties, the Brazilian political and economic situation was unstable. Inflation was uncontrolled, strikes were commonplace, and an internal tension was increasing. It was during that time that the government elaborated the first code of telecommunications (see Chapter 3).

TABLE 5**Number of TV Stations Licenses,
by Period and President**

Period and President(s)	number of Licenses
1955-1960 Café Filho:1954-1956 J. Kubitschek:1956-1961	8
1960-1964 J. Kubitschek:1956-1961 Jânio Quadros:1961 João Goulart :1961-1964	14
1964-1969 H.A. Castelo Branco:1964-1967 A.da Costa e Silva:1967-1969	23
1969-1974 Emilio G. Medici: 1969-1974	20
1974-1979 Ernesto Geisel: 1974-1979	47
Total	112

Source: SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the Ministry of Communications.

In 1964, when the military revolution replaced President João Goulart, there was a radical change in the political situation. This change affected television stations directly because both the political system and the socioeconomic situation of the country were totally modified. As a result, the revenue from advertising was decreased, and stations needed to find other ways of solving financial problems. The military regime established a new political system in which mass media communications

were accepted as agent of modernization and as a tool for the maintenance of national integration, national security, and social peace.

During the first six years of the new political system, Brazilian telecommunications services underwent a technical transformation. The government created new conditions for the expansion of broadcast services and established the regulatory agencies which were concerned with the technical and economic situation of the broadcast enterprises. The new technocratic-military system got involved with television, principally in reference to issues such as ownership, control, and financial support. However, the government did not express concern about the influence and content of television programs until 1970.

Television Content and Official Influence

As discussed in Chapter 3, broadcast enterprises are under government control, which encompasses, besides concession of licenses and allocation of frequencies, a series of political considerations such as censorship and direct governmental recommendations on program content. Before President Médici took office, the government had worried only about technological aspects of television, but from Médici's government on, the state began to concern itself directly with the content of the mass media. (9) In January 1970, President Médici signed a decree, which banned all publications, and broadcast features found "offensive to morals or good customs," (10) and in September 1970, he sent a message to the participants in the VI Brazilian Broadcast Congress, which took place in Poços de Caldas, Minas Gerais. In his message, President Médici said that he believed in the evolution of Brazilian television because he felt "television to be indispensable" to the acceleration of services for social well being. He further stated that businessmen need to look for a noble objective for Brazilian commercial television because the "government cannot wait inactively and silently, while competition increases the size of audience, resulting in a loss for the populace which is deprived of educational TV programs" (11).

His words reverberated among businessmen involved in Brazilian television. From that date, the government began to concern itself officially with the quality level of programs in order to counteract the effects of programs which offered more and more suspense, action. Strong emotions, and violence, all of which contributed to growth in audience size and in profits for the television stations. According to research undertaken from March 18 to March 24, 1969, by the Jornal do Brasil, violence was among the appeals most utilized by television in Rio de Janeiro. Table 6 lists some of the themes of television programs in Rio de Janeiro.

TABLE 6

Program Themes in

Rio de Janeiro

<u>Program Themes</u> <u>March 18-24,1969</u>	<u>% of Total Number</u> <u>of Programs</u>
Traditional values of childhood and family	47.73
Violence	43.77
Ostentation and upward social mobility	30.12
Fantasy	26.20
Eroticism	03.90
Youth movement	08.60
Humor	33.31
Politics	14.58
Culture and Technology	17.17
Grotesque topics	05.25

Source: Muniz Sodré, 1971, p. 68

At the end of 1971, the "lower quality of taste" of the programs broadcast by the commercial stations led to the naming of an interministerial commission to study television content (see the list of typical weekly programs in 1971 in Table 7). The members of that commission were representatives of different ministries: the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Labor. The conclusions of the commission were never divulged. According to Hygino Corsetti, who served as minister of communications during Médici's administration, the conclusions were presented to and discussed with the concessionaires. The Ministry of Communica-

tions recognized that television was a factor in development and an instrument of social and economic integration. Corsetti explained the interference of his Ministry in the content of television by saying that Brazilian television was not following the government's efforts in the electronic sector to build a great Brazil, economically strong and “culturally modern”:

First of all, I want to say that my interference has President Médici's knowledge and recommendations. I confess that the quality of what is being presented by Brazilian TV is already as much of a concern to me as the extension of networks and the technical improvement on the quality of the images. (12)

The Médici administration was particularly important to the development of Brazilian television because it established the National Program for Educational Television (Prontel), it expanded the infrastructure of telecommunication services, it introduced color television, and it facilitated the emergence of new sources of television advertising revenues by means of the “Economic Miracle”. (Economic influences on the development of television are further discussed in the next chapter). And it was in the name of the National Security Council and in order to maintain social peace and national development that during Médici's term in office the mass media (principally radio and television) were subjected more and more to censorship.

TABLE 7

Television Content, 1971	
<u>Broadcast Content</u>	<u>Total Hours/Week</u>
Film	1,080.5
Advertising	557.9
Soap opera	416.7
Game show	307.6
Sports	262.5
News	241.2
Education	218.2
Humor	152.0
Popular music	114.6
Arts, literature, and science	59.2
Religion	19.2
Theater and poetry	15.3

Source: Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, 1972:869

From Médici's administration through Ernesto Geisel's, many ministers, teachers, and critics made speeches about the educational and cultural implications of television, about its program content, and about its negative effects. As a result, Brazilian television improved its techniques and "cultural standards" and nationalized its programming (see Chapter 1). In this manner, the ministers began to address policy issues more intensively. One preoccupation of the government was expressed in the message by Euclides Quandt de Oliveira (minister of communications during Geisel's administration) to the Sixth Brazilian Tele-Education Meeting, which took place in Belo Horizonte in October 1974. According to Quandt de Oliveira,

Brazilian commercial TV is based on a philosophy of private enterprise but, because of its strength of penetration and persuasion, it cannot be treated as other mass media, i.e., the press.

Because of its specific nature it must be entrusted with a great deal of responsibility in respect to culture, education, and national efforts for development. This can only become true if the right message reaches the right audience. Commercial experience and research data might provide useful cues for such an enterprise. (13)

The Geisel administration, through its minister of communications, Quandt de Oliveira, addressed many recommendations to broadcast enterprises. These recommendations exerted a strong influence on television networks, which were continually reminded of their responsibilities to national development and national culture. On November 19, 1974, during a lecture at the Anhembi Faculty of Social Communication, Quandt de Oliveira talked about the canned material broadcast by Brazilian television:

57% of a TV program is imported and Brazilian technicians produce 43%. From this 43%, 34% is foreign material, edited by Brazilian stations. That means, for 109 hours of a one week program, only 31 are genuinely Brazilian: the other 78 are imported. ... Commercial TV imposes upon children and youth a kind of culture that has nothing to do with Brazilian culture... Instead of acting as a factor of creation and diffusion of Brazilian culture, TV is playing the role of a privileged medium of cultural import, and is denaturing Brazilian creativity. (14)

Quandt de Oliveira made another speech October 1974, to the Fourth Southern States of Brazil Congress on Broadcasting:

The ministry ... expects that radio and television stations will fulfill their contractual and legal obligations, their code of ethics, so as to reach increased cooperation for the achievement of goals compatible with the efforts of a country to take off from underdevelopment to its deserved position in the world picture (15).

In 1977, Minister Quandt de Oliveira addressed another speech to broadcast managers, during the Fourth Centerwestern Congress of Broadcast (Belo Horizonte, May 18). In that speech the minister of communications criticized the excessive violence on Brazilian television and argued that violence is a problem that must be resolved by the concessionaires themselves. As support for his criticism, Quandt de Oliveira said that a group from his ministry had monitored violence on afternoon programs during a month, or 200 hours, on two television stations in Brasilia. The minister announced that the National Communications Council had been reorganized and that it would "dedicate a large part of its attention to the content transmitted by Brazilian radio and television, in order to establish norms and orientations related to the topic of violence. It does not intend to intervene in the freedom of choice of the programs by the men of television, but all these problems will be discussed by the Council itself." (16)

The growth of Brazilian television occurred during a time (1968-1979) when it had to operate under restrictions established by Institutional Act no.5 of December 13, 1968, when the president could make secret laws, and when Brazilian institutions were controlled by strong censorship. Between December 1968 and June 1978 (Press censorship in Brazil was officially ended on June 8, 1978), Brazilian mass media were controlled by strong censorship, which was exerted in accordance with the censor's criteria. During that time, "it was difficult to broadcast about almost anything of importance."(17) This being the case, one can infer that Quandt de Oliveira recommendations exerted a strong influence on television content. As a result of the recommendations, admonitions, and criticism, television nationalized its programs, which today are typically Brazilian in treatment, theme, and style.

However, although the Médici and Geisel administrations made a solid contribution to the improvement of the "cultural standard" and technical quality of television programs, they were responsible for strong censorship, which mutilated and limited Brazilian television. According to Gerald Thomas, "in 1974, for instance, no less than 103 items were banned from TV and radio. The bans ranged from

political issues to a beauty contest. In 1978, only seven items were banned, and this might appear a reassuring figure compared to 1974. But statistics are misleading, and recent prohibitions cover a much wider ground." (18) Further,

In São Paulo 36 newsmen from Radio Tupi were dismissed for refusing to alter a program to be shown jointly on TV and radio. Only 15 minutes before it was due to go on the air, the censor's phone call "advised" them to cut a whole speech from the program by the Archbishop of São Paulo, Cardinal Arns, one of the most outspoken personalities in Brazil's recent history. The producers demanded a written order. The impracticability of the demand was clear: the phone call came from Brasília and the station is in São Paulo, so the program was shown as scheduled. After two weeks of pressure from the government and Tupi's managers, the newsmen were dismissed. (19)

SOCIOECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION

From 1950 to 1980, Brazil experienced fundamental changes, marked by rapid industrialization, urbanization, inflation, and a succession of political upheavals. This chapter will briefly present some of the socioeconomic factors, which have directly or indirectly contributed to the growth of Brazilian television during the last three decades.

Urban Industrialization and Television

According to Muniz Sodré, after completion of the agricultural-economic-cycle of exportation, during the thirties, when coffee was the principal export, Brazil underwent a series of economic transformations, centering on urban industrialization which contributed to the intensification of the process of modernization of the cities. (1) It was during President Getúlio Vargas's "Estado Novo" ("New State") and after the post-war era that industry began to exert a significant influence on the Brazilian economy. Vargas's policy was oriented to replacing the importation of nondurable consumer goods with production in loco. Under the guise of economic nationalism, the government itself made investments in the expansion of heavy industry and began building the infrastructure that was necessary for the production of durable consumer goods. Between 1945 and 1960, Brazil experienced rapid industrial growth. (2)

The advent of Brazilian television (in 1950) was during a period of industrial growth. With the intensification of industrialization in the fifties, migration from rural to urban areas increased, and radio became an important source of information for people in the big cities. According to Sodré, it was during that phase that big industrialization projects emerged, as well as political demagogues, the proletariat, and the urban middle classes. (3)

According to Gordon Campbell, migrants were primarily Italians and people from the underdeveloped Brazilian regions, who were attracted by jobs in São Paulo's industries. In the early sixties, São Paulo was established as Brazil's commercial and industrial capital, a fact that contributed to the media concentration in São Paulo. (4) Table 8 lists the number of television concessions by region.

TABLE 8

Television Station Licenses by Region					
Region	Number of Concession				
	1955-60	1960-64	1964 -69	1969-74	1974 -79
North	-	01	04	02	06
Northeast	01	03	05	08	05
Southeast	03	05	01	05	14
South	04	03	07	05	17
West-center	-	02	06	-	05
Brazil	08	14	23	20	47

Note: Each period begins in March.

Source: SSR/Secretary of Broadcast Services of the Ministry of Communications.

In Brazil urbanization has occurred simultaneously with economic and social development. According to Nely Camargo

In 1950, 20 percent of the population was urban, the remaining 80 percent living in rural areas. Now [1975] , 60 percent of the population live in cities, only 40 percent remaining in rural areas. As a corollary to this tendency, the growth of cities of over

100,000 inhabitants has been remarkable. In 1940, only ten cities were above this figure: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife, Salvador, Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Belém, Santos, Fortaleza, and Niterói. In 1960, this figure grew to thirty-one cities. In 1974 it was over ninety and today its number is estimated at 140 cities. (5)

It should be noted that in the early sixties, there were 15 television stations operating in the more important cities. It was only when the effect of increased industrial consumption were consolidated that television stations became viable as commercial enterprises and began to compete for income from advertising sources. In order to receive increased support from advertising, television was driven to seek larger audiences and thus larger profits.

In short, the introduction of television in Brazil coincides with the beginning of an important period of change in economic and social structures. Taking into account that Brazilian television is urban-based and urban-oriented; it can be broadly inferred that television benefited directly from both the industrialization and the urbanization process. From industry it received advertising revenues, and from the large concentration of urban population, it had a virtually guaranteed audience. In addition, Nely Camargo claims that "Almost 90 percent of Brazilian homes are within the range of television transmissions. However, the ownership of television sets is not homogeneous. Market studies have demonstrated that in the cities, even the very poor families think that television is a must. The television set comes before the purchase of any other home facilities." (6)

The Economic Development Model

The 1964 military regime adopted an economic development model whose principal result was the Brazilian "Economic Miracle." According to a document entitled "Goals and Bases of Government Actions," published in 1970 during Médici's term in office, the 1964 revolution was intended "to create basic conditions for genuine development, democracy and sovereignty." (7)

President Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco presented some of his ideas about security and development during a lecture at the Escola Superior de Guerra in March 1967. In referring to economic development, he stated that

in the economic sense, a country's industry and level of technology ultimately determined its military power. Socially speaking, even a satisfactory level of economic development, if accompanied by excessive concentration of wealth and growing social inequalities, led to tensions and strife that would prevent the institutions from working properly and would compromise development and security. (8)

According to Thomas Pompeu Brasil Netto, the Brazilian model adopted by the 1964 military regime is directed to build a "modern capitalist society" (9) According to him, Brazilian economic development has four basic characteristics: (1) political and social stability as a means of attaining rapid economic development; (2) geographical integration and better income distribution as a means of overcoming regional economic disparities; (3) diversification of the industrial sector to create efficient systems of financial, communication, transportation, and food supply services; and (4) the creation of new opportunities for private enterprises, which are stimulated by such policies as export credit and the adoption of flexibility rates.

The first two presidents of the military regime Castelo Branco and Costa e Silva created the basic conditions for the Economic Miracle, which occurred during Médici's term in office. Among innumerable governmental actions, the Law of Foreign Capital, signed by Castelo Branco in August, 1964, was one of the strongest contributors to the rapid growth of the industrial sector and it indirectly contributed to the maintenance of social peace through the creation of new job opportunities and a decrease in unemployment. According to Campbell,

in his message to Congress introducing the bill, Castelo said that foreign capital could contribute to the nation's growth by raising the rate of investment, strengthening the country's capacity to import, and increasing its stock of technology. Having recognized that foreign capital was desirable for Brazil, the government has decided on a pragmatic policy with a single aim, to secure the greatest possible benefit. (10)

The post-1964 governments made many concessions to foreign investors, who, together with the local industrialists, stimulated both television and consumerism chiefly by means of television advertisements. (11) This is borne out by Alan Wells's statement regarding advertising in Brazil:

Local industries, as well as developed country exporters, are interested in placing their advertisements on the television screen. Indeed, one agency noted that its Brazilian clients spend proportionately more than their American counterparts on television, as opposed to other forms of advertising. They are more cosmopolitan than the foreign "moderns."... Local manufacturers using the television media for advertising are probably either American and other foreign subsidiaries, or "modernist" domestic companies that cater to sectoral consumerism. (12)

The creation of Institutional Act no.5 in December 1968 was another strong contribution to the accomplishment of the economic goals, which formed the basis of the Economic Miracle. According to

Campbell, after Institutional Act no.5, "the Congress having been abruptly ordered into recess, a spate of decrees was issued affecting the public and private sectors. No longer impeded by the 1967 Constitution, which it could amend at will, the administration was able to convert its decisions rapidly into law. (13)

The Brazilian Economic

Miracle and Television

The Brazilian Economic Miracle occurred during Médici's term, a period of strong political repression and control of the mass media by means of censorship, the National Security Law, and Institutional Act no.5. This fact is significant if one considers that in order to attract foreign capital the government needed to present an image of political and social stability which, according to the military regime's concepts, is a fundamental condition for economic development. However, as Joan R. Dassin comments, it is obvious that "press censorship alone did not open the way for the Economic Miracle. In fact, prohibitions on publishing economic information were relatively few. Elio Gaspari argues that, in fact, the 'Miracle' was willingly supported by the major dailies and newsmagazines, in a deliberate gesture of approval for an economic model, which they not only defended but also profited from. (14) Dassin further states that the regime's economic development model was supported by "systematic political repression" through which the great majority of the Brazilian people were excluded from the benefits of that economic development.

In addition, Institutional Act no.5, which centralized decision-making powers in the executive branch, was used with the intent of promoting economic development. According to Albert Fishlow, "the director of the Brazilian AID mission implicitly concurred in February 1969: 'in terms of general economic policies, I would say if anything there has been a net improvement; the Finance Minister can now do by decree things that before had to go through Congress; they have been passing out decrees left and right, and most of them are to the good.'"

The Economic Miracle occurred between 1969 and 1974, as a result of an authoritarian model of economic development. During that period, the annual growth rate reached 9 to 11 percent. As a result of the Miracle, Brazil, or more exactly the southern region and São Paulo, was transformed into the "largest ... industrial economy among the less developed nations (16).

Since the Law of Foreign Capital was passed, in 1964, foreign corporations have increased their investments in Brazil. In 1967, for example, the largest advertisers in the country were multinational corporations that, during the economic boom concentrated their advertising campaigns on television. According to Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1967 the twelve major advertisers in Brazil were the following corporations: Willys Overland, Sidney Ross, Volkswagen, Gillette, Gessy Lever, Nestlé, Ford, Rhodia, Fleishman and Royal, Coca-Cola, Shell and Colgate Palmolive. (17)

According to a survey in the World Advertising Expenditures, Brazil is one of the ten countries, which spent over one billion dollars in media advertising. In 1976, it was the fourth country (behind only the

United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom) in dollars spent on television advertising Brazil allocated 42 percent of all of its advertising expenditures during 1976 to television. (18) Table 9 shows Brazilian television advertising expenditures between 1968 and 1979.

TABLE 9
BRAZILIAN TELEVISION
ADVERTISING EXPENDITURES
(Millions of Dollars)

Year	Total Measured Media Advertising Expenditures(*)	Advertising Expenditures on Television	% of total Expenditure
1968	233.8	100.5	43.0
1970	253.8	98.4	38.8
1972	333.2	128.3	38.5
1974	565.1	209.1	37.0
1976	1,206.5	506.9	42.0
1977	1,610.9	697.1	43.3
1979	1,582.4	684.8	43.3

(*) Measured media: print, cinema, radio, television, outdoor, and transportation

It was during the Economic Miracle that the Brazilian GNP reached the level of \$80 billion. As a result of annual growth rates, per capita income increased from \$312 in 1964 to \$800 in 1974. (19) In 1977, according to the World Bank, the Brazilian GNP per capita was \$1,360. (20) As a reflection of economic development, not only was there an increase in advertising expenditure, but between 1969 and 1979, there was also what can be called a television boom; that is, the military regime granted 67 licenses for television channels to private enterprises throughout the national territory (see Table 8).

Television received an additional benefit in 1968, when direct credit was provided to the consumer a novelty introduced by the military government in order to facilitate the purchase of goods produced by Brazilian industries. In that year, sales of television sets increased by 48 percent over the previous year. (21) According to Médici's message to the National Congress in 1974, the telecommunications industries had a growth average of 20 percent between 1970 and 1973. (22)

One can argue, then, that the growth of Brazilian television was directly and indirectly influenced by the economic development of the country, that is, by the increase of GNP per capita, by the increase of per capita income, by better income distribution, (23) as well as by the more intensive process of urbanization after 1960.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Starting from the point of view that since 1964 military influence is a fact in many, if not in all, sectors of Brazilian society, this study was undertaken within a perspective of the influence of the military, through which present Brazilian regulation, and the political and socioeconomic conditions during the 1964 to 1980 period were considered in reference to television.

Summary of the Findings

Brazilian television was established in 1950 as an electronic toy of the economic elite. During its first decade it was a luxury. During the sixties, when the country was struggling for development and modernization, television was considered a proof of modernity. During the seventies, it became a priority for each Brazilian family. Thus, Brazilian television underwent, between 1950 and 1979, three distinct phases: (1) the elitist when improvisation was common and the audiences were limited; (2) the populist-sensationalist; (3) the technical, during which the medium was characterized by technical improvement, by the search for "cultural standards," and by the national production of television programming.

During television's first decade, all programs were locally produced. However, when the video tape recorder and the "telecine" machine were introduced during the sixties, television began to import films and shows. During the seventies, after the Brazilians had already developed their technical skills, national production was again undertaken. Therefore, we can conclude that television was affected by the introduction of new electronic equipment, as well as by the technological facilities (microwave, satellite, and color-system) established by the government.

As discussed in chapter 2, the Escola Superior de Guerra provided the 1964 military regime not only with a doctrine of "Security and Development," but also with military and civilian graduates, through whom the government "hoped to win the support of opinion leaders all over the country. (1) It was on that doctrine and its objectives that the National Security Council based and projected the National Objectives and the National Security Law. The economic development model, which directly affected television in its economic-miracle

phase, was based on those objectives.

In Brazil the short-term and the long-term responses of the military regime were geared toward accelerating order, progress, security, and modernization, including strong state participation in the economy, friendliness to multinational investment, and development of basic conditions for national integration through the telecommunication system. The military regime contributed directly and indirectly to the development of Brazilian television, which benefited from the social, political, and economic situation of the period between 1964 and 1980.

It should be noted that the mass media, principally radio and television, were used by the military regime to promote a new social and developmental order. The regime used broadcast media in order to build a national spirit based on the preservation of Brazilian beliefs, culture, and values, and through which the revolutionary movement's aspirations and concepts of development, peace, and integrity were to be imposed on the Brazilian people. In order that its messages might reach the entire population and that this proof of modernity might be expanded throughout the country, it improved operational and technical conditions. In doing so, it contributed to the development and dissemination of television throughout the nation.

The 1964 military regime promoted the most important structural changes in the telecommunications sector by establishing the Ministry of Communications and its respective departments and enterprises. The establishment of the Ministry of Communications contributed to the reduction of power of some broadcast regulatory agencies to which broadcast enterprises had had earlier access. Interference by and influence of private organizations over regulatory agencies was thus reduced. (2)

Television was directly affected by regulations passed during the military regime, as well as by the institutions established by it. The Press Law, the National Security Law, the National Code of Telecommunications (through which the government supervises television), and, principally, the five Institutional Acts of the military regime affected the development of Brazilian television. It should be recalled that the Institutional Acts, especially no.5, were, among other things, intensively used to justify federal intervention without constitutional safeguards.

The initial growth of Brazilian television was attributed to political favoritism, in that the concession of television channels was made without a preconceived plan. After the establishment of the Ministry of Communications and after taking into account not only national necessities but also the National Security Council's objectives of national development and integration, the concession of television channels began to be more planned. Licenses continued to be granted to groups, which would take a supportive attitude toward the military regime's actions, however.

The strongest political influence on the growth of Brazilian television occurred in 1964, when President João Goulart was overthrown by a coup d'état. The coup affected television stations directly because both the political system and the socioeconomic situation of the country were totally modified by the adoption of a military development-model.

Because the mass media were accepted by the military regime as agents of modernization and as a tool

for the maintenance of national integration, national security, and social peace, the military also began to be concerned with television content. Broadcast enterprises are under government control, which, besides concession of licenses and allocation of frequencies, encompasses a series of political considerations, which include censorship and direct governmental recommendations concerning programming content.

The military regime only began to be concerned with the content of programs in 1970. From Médici's administration through Geisel's, the government began to express vehement disapproval of the violence and lack of "cultural standards" on television. Some speeches recommended that broadcasters look for a noble objective for Brazilian commercial television, and that it "must be entrusted with a great deal of responsibility in respect to culture, education and national efforts for development. (3)

Those recommendations exerted a strong influence on television networks, which were continually reminded of their responsibilities to national development and national culture. As a result of the recommendations, admonitions, criticism, and suggestions from the government, television nationalized its programs, which today are typically Brazilian in treatment, theme, and style. If Brazilian television, in itself, is neither good nor bad, at least it presents a Brazilian standard, which has in TV Globo Network its best example of success.

There is also a close relationship between the growth of television and Brazil's economic and social development. The development of Brazilian television is directly correlated with factors such as urbanization and industrialization and the level of literacy, as well as with the increase of GNP and per capita income, better income distribution, and the increase in advertising expenditure.

One of the principal factors of the growth of Brazilian television was the military regime's economic development model, whose best result was the so-called Brazilian Economic Miracle (1969-1974). As a reflection of the economic development between 1969 and 1980, there also occurred in Brazil what can be called a television boom. The military regime granted 67 licenses for television channels to private enterprises throughout the national territory. At the same time, the production of TV receivers was increased and direct credit to the consumer facilitated the purchase of TV sets and goods produced by Brazilian industries and advertised on television.

The fast growth of Brazilian television between 1964 and 1980 is a direct and indirect result of the military regime's policies. Because of this, television has reflected the regime's positive and negative influences. As a consequence of national growth under a political-military system geared to generate goods, luxury service, and social welfare, Brazilian television has been used to promote entertainment, to encourage consumption, and to diffuse Brazil's economic achievement and, at the same time, to perpetuate the military regime's image.

Commentary

In the early sixties, both military personnel and civilians were aware of the necessity for change and were looking for methods to develop, integrate, and modernize the country. After the 1964 coup d'état, the military people found the opportunity to achieve an economic development model based on the Escola Superior de Guerra's doctrine of "Security and Development," from which the National Security Council's objectives were established. These objectives have since been applied by all administrations of the military regime.

Coincidentally, in the sixties both UNESCO and the United States were advising the utilization of mass media communication to promote national development. Developed countries like the United States were the models for underdeveloped or developing countries. It should be noted that during the fifties and the early sixties, development was centered around economic growth, and industrialization was considered the principal factor of development. (4)

Considering that the Brazilian military regime economic model had as its objectives the increase of GNP and per capita income, and the provision of a strong industrial base, to provide the country with a strong industry; the creation of a telecommunications system to be used to promote national security and national development and to eliminate illiteracy, one can say that Brazil was one of the few countries that accepted the UNESCO and United States proposals of the sixties for using radio and television to promote educational and socioeconomic development. We can infer this because the 1964 military regime stimulated structural changes in the telecommunications sector by creating the Ministry of Communications, among other official institutions, which built the technical facilities which allowed the rapid dissemination of television stations throughout the country. As minister of communications Hygino Corsetti (1969-1974) said, "TV is not just a dynamic medium due to its potential for communication. We must not forget that today, for us, TV is also a factor of development, a precious tool for social and economic integration. (5)

Taking into account that, at that time, television was high on the list of proofs of modernization, the military regime spent a great deal of effort to disseminate that "proof" throughout the country. Through radio and television, the regime could inform people of the regime's undertakings; as well as reach both the literate and illiterate.

Those who are familiar with the theories and uses of mass media to promote development know that media alone do not cause development; they do help it, however. Mass communication can be of great usefulness in the promotion of development if it is used at the right moment and with the right message and directed toward the right group. However, economic and social development can occur with or without mass media. (6)

In the specific case of the Brazilian military regime, national development and national security were promoted by means of the adoption of one series of Institutional Acts, which permitted the military regime to

impose the new order without restrictions from laws or the constitution. At the same time, mass media communications, principally television and radio, were intensively used to stimulate the national spirit, to infuse and to transmit a public confidence in what the military administration was doing. "A sophisticated experiment has been performed whereby sensitive social issues have given way to the idea of the triumph of Brazil's economic achievement, with which both wealthy businessmen and the urban poor, who have to feed hungry families on a minimum wage, are encouraged to identify ". (7)

These are important points because since 1964 exceptional measures have been adopted and things that should have been impossible were realized in a short time. As Nely Camargo says,

The fact is understandable if we consider that the present Brazilian government is a revolutionary one. Exceptional measures must be short-term ones and must be seen in a revolutionary context. This means that there is a strong and conscious dynamic interaction between the Brazilian mass media, "intelligentsia," the government and public opinion, towards a communication policy which equates best, in the field of information, individual goals and constitutional rights, the interests and needs of the media, as enterprises, and the highest objectives and interests for the nation's development as defined by the government's plans and programs. (8)

Despite regulations reserving the ownership of mass media only for Brazilians, and despite the military regime's concerns about the preservation of Brazilian cultural values, the mass media, principally television, are more and more under the control of foreign groups because of the high degree of dependence on advertising. It should be noted that the largest advertisers in Brazil are multinational corporations, which are exerting their influence on Brazilian society by means of program sales, technology, flow of entertainment, market orientation, advertising, and so forth. The transnational corporations are, according to many scholars, imposing their tastes, values, and lifestyles, and controlling the mass media by making them financially dependent on advertising. It is important to note that if the Brazilian mass media, especially television, are financially dependent on advertising; transnational corporations can easily control communication content.

In addition, if one considers that TV-network conglomerates, such as Globo organization includes other organizations, such as magazine, newspapers, film companies, record companies, and radio station, it is easy to conclude that Brazilian public interest, tastes, beliefs, culture, and values are under the control of corporations, which are creating a structure of dependence in order to reinforce their values and impose their products on Brazilian society.

It would be foolish to attempt any suggestion for changing or controlling this situation at the present time because it is a result of the capitalist system of western society in which Brazil is included and because it is a result of the economic model adopted by the Brazilian government in order to promote national development through the industrialization of the country with foreign capital. However, this topic can be included by

government officials and Brazilian scholars in future discussions of mass media in Brazil, especially since multinational advertising will exert more and more influence on the social functions of Brazilian television in particular, and on the social functions of mass media communications in general.

The Future of Brazilian

Television

Undoubtedly, Brazilian television is living its golden age. Scholars blame television for producing foreign values to Brazilian behavior and culture. At the same time, Brazil is being accused by neighboring countries of culturally invading their territories and imposing Brazilian culture through radio and television. A similar phenomenon is found between the United States and Canada (9).

According to Francisco Costa e Silva, the regional delegate of Dentel (National Department of Telecommunications) in the state of Paraná, there is a national plan to distribute radio and television channels throughout Brazil's frontier area (see table 3) (10)

Brazil is to install three television channels in Foz do Iguacu, on the border with Argentina and Paraguay, and thus, all borders with these two countries will be reached by six Brazilian broadcasting stations and retransmitters located in the state of Paraná.

Many people in Argentina and in Paraguay are worried about the Brazilian advance and are now trying to block it. In the province of Misiones, which borders Brazil, the Argentines are building a series of retransmitters for their own channels. Paraguay is establishing a TV station in Puerto Strossner, in the vicinity of Foz do Iguacu'.

The Brazilian electronic invasion, or "the electronic war," as it was called by the Brazilian weekly newsmagazine Veja, is more intense and can be measured by the number of radio stations in that area (see table 3). (11) According to Veja, these three countries (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) are successively increasing the power of their radio stations. According to journalist Teresa Furtado of Veja, in Puerto Strossner, a city of one hundred thousand inhabitants, the influence of Brazilian television is so intense that a lot of people are able to speak Portuguese correctly. She states that the young people have in the last few years started to incorporate typically Brazilian expressions into their vocabularies. She also says that the population of that border area admires Brazilian soap operas, principally Globo' s. (12)

Some Limitations of this Study

There are some influences, other than the military regime, that should have helped or contributed to the dissemination of TV in Brazil. Among them are the fact that Portuguese is the only official language and that it is used uniformly throughout the country; the influence of the Catholic church and various cultural groups; the advertising concentration on television; and the process of internal migration, which began before the advent of television, and therefore before the military regime. As a result of that intensive migration, the Brazilian urban population today is greater than the rural population. If one considers that television in Brazil was basically an urban phenomenon and that it continues to be urban-based and urban-oriented, the process of urbanization was bound to have had a strong influence on the growth of television. A large audience is almost tantamount to high profits. It should be noted that only during the last 5 years, thanks to the military regime's concern with territorial integration, could television signals be received in practically all points of the national territory.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Nely Camargo and Virgílio B.Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil, p.41.
2. Wayne A. Selcher, The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government, p.24.

Chapter 1

1. Muniz Sodré, O Monopólio da Fala, p.9.
2. Nely Camargo and Virgílio B.Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil, p.41.
3. "Salute: A Globo Levou o Troféu dos Americanos," Isto É, 14 March 1979, p.94.
4. "Reações à Lei: O Novo Código de Menores Provoca um Debate," Veja, 28 November 1979, p.129.
5. "The Globo Television Network Shows," in Brazil: Country, People, Television, a promotional booklet produced by TV Globo Network and distributed when it received the "Salute" trophy in New York, March 1979.
6. "Vinte Anos de Televisão," Veja, 23 Septem 1970, p.61. It should be noted that the first Latin American television was Mexico City's XH-TV, which began broadcasting on 31 August 1950.
7. Ibid, p.61.
8. Ibid., p.63.
9. Sodré, O Monopólio, p.95.
10. "Global Report: New Development and the Outlook for Television, as Reported on the Scene

from Major Areas of the World," Television Age, 19 July 1965, P.31.

11. Gerald Thomas, "Closely Watched TV," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8, no.4(July-August 1979):43.
12. Sodré, O Monopólio, p.95.
13. Veja, nº 107 (23 September 1970)p. 63
14. Gabriel Cohn, "Mudar Os Conteúdos Não É Decisivo," Receita Brasil (1978),p.188.
15. "Global Report," 31 January 1966, P.30.
16. Jeremy Tunstall, The Media Are American, 1977 p.182. He further states that "Chateaubriand group disintegrated with the death of its founder and another media group, Globo, had by the early 1970's achieved an even dominant position in the Brazilian media" (p. 182).
17. Thomas, "Closely Watched TV," p.43.
18. João Rodolfo do Prado, TV: Quem Vê Quem, p.127
19. Television Age, 31 January 1966, p.30.
20. Prado, TV, p.121
21. Ibid.,p.115.
22. Tunstall, The Media, p.182.
23. Thomas, "Closely Watched TV," p. 44.
24. Mario de Moraes and Ronaldo Moraes, "João Calmon denuncia: TV Globo na etapa do açúcar," O Cruzeiro, 29 April 1967, p. 80.
25. Antônio F.Costella, O Controle da Informação no no Brasil,p.138.
26. Television Age, 19 July 1965,p.32.
27. "The Globo Network," in Brazil: Country, People, Television. According to that publication "Globo Network owns 2,000 square kilometers of privately constructed microwave interlace. This ranks Brazil second only to the United States among countries with the most extensive microwave systems in the world."
28. Sodré, O Monopólio, p.100.
29. "Global mesmo: A Network of Brazil Sai Pelo Mundo," Veja, 14 February 1979, p. 65.

30. Prado, TV, p.211. See also Veja, 14 February 1979, Pp.65-66; Brazil: Country, People, Television, 1979; and The Miami Herald, 2 August 1981.
31. "Television Serials," in Brazil: Country, People, Television. It should be noted that during its development, Brazilian television could not depend on a film industry, as American television could. However, since 1960 a genre, which is neither film nor theater, has been developed by Brazilian producers, namely, the "Telenovela" (soap opera), which is produced nationally and which maintains high audience ratings. The television critic of the Brazilian weekly newsmagazine Veja, as quoted in Globo's booklet, says that "Globo did not invent the 'telenovela.' From its studios, however, came the decisive contribution towards making it a cinematographic genre of near-Hollywood proportions, though typically Brazilian in treatment, theme, style, and its extremely heavy production schedules. Globo's four current television serials considered as a whole are the equivalent of a full-length feature film per night."
32. Brasil em dados-75, p.189.
33. Guy Gugliotta, "Brazil Moves into TV Age with Astounding Success," The Miami Herald, 2 August 1981.

Chapter 2

1. Wayne A. Selcher, The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government, 1977, Pp. 2-3.
2. Thomas E. Weil et al., Area Handbook for Brazil, 1975, p. 248.
3. Ibid., pgs 249 and 393.
4. Ibid., p.250.
5. Maurício Dias, "Aquela que Tomou o Poder," Isto É no. 16 (14 March 1979), pp.54-55. In addition, Dias explains that the Escola Superior de Guerra is located in Fort São João, in Rio de Janeiro, and occupies five buildings, in which there are three auditoriums, twenty study rooms and one specialized library with approximately 20,000 books.
6. Selcher, National Security Doctrine, p.3.
7. Gordon Campbell, Brazil Struggles for Development, 1972, Pp. 80-81.
8. Enjolras José de Castro Camargo, Estudo de Problemas Brasileiros, p.47. See also Selcher, National Security Doctrine, 1977, p.8.
9. Campbell, Brazil, p.84.
10. Castro Camargo, Estudo, Pp.53-54.

11. Selcher, National Security Doctrine, 9
12. Barry Ames, Rhetoric and Reality in a Militarized Regime: Brazil Since 1964,p.8.
13. Campbell, Brazil, p.83.
14. Ibid., p.86.
15. José Odelso Schneider, et al., Realidade Brasileira, p. 230.
16. Selcher, National Security Doctrine, 1977, p.12.
17. Schneider, Realidade Brasileira, pp.231-232.
18. Selcher, National Security Doctrine, p.15.
19. Ibid. ,p.17.
20. Castro Camargo, Estudo, p.236.
21. Selcher, National Security Doctrine,p. 7, says that "the phrase 'Security and Development,' the modern equivalent of the national flag's motto of 'Order and Progress,' has become the watchword and legitimizer of military rule extending into the indefinite future."
22. Campbell, Brazil, p.116. In addition Campbell states on page 117 that "after the football triumph, they brought out the slogans and the sticker labels, from the President's 'No one can stop this country' (Ninguém segura este país) to 'Brazil, love it or leave it!,' 'Brazil, I'm staying!,' and 'Brazil, count me! "

Chapter 3

1. Nely Camargo, and Virgílio B.Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil, p.65.
2. Wayne A.Selcher, The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government,P.17, gives some examples of censorship in Brazil
 Censorship... has been used to discourage both press sensationalism and full public knowledge or debate about topics such as the 1974-76 meningitis epidemic, frequent high clerical criticisms of the government, rumored political openings, torture of political prisoners, financial scandals, expulsion of urban squatters or peasants from land, terrorist and guerrilla activity, and presidential succession, all in the name of national security.
3. Gerald Thomas, "Closely Watched TV,"Pp.43-46.

4. Camargo, Communication Policies, p.62.
5. Antônio F.Costella, O Controle da Informação, p.125.
6. Mauro Almeida, A Comunicação de Massa no Brasil , p.43. On the same page Almeida says that the first Brazilian radio station was established on 6 April 1919, the "Rádio Clube de Pernambuco," in Recife. However, other historians do not consider that station as the first in Brazil because it was primarily a telegraphic system, transmitting and receiving messages through Morse Code
7. Camargo, Communication Policies, pp.24-25.
It should be noted that the national Council of Telecommunications (Contel) was disbanded in 1972 by Decree no.70,583. However, after four years, Contel was recreated by Decree-Law no.78,921, of 7 December 1976.
8. Ibid.,in footnote,p.24.
9. Selcher, National Security Doctrine, p . 21
10. Elihu Katz, and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World,1977, p.45.
11. Gordon Campbell, Brazil Struggles for Development, p.59.
12. Costella, O Controle, p.138.
13. "Globo Organization," in Brazil: Country, People, Television, 1979.
14. According to Mauro Almeida, the Excelsior group had two television stations(Channel 2 in Rio and channel 9 in São Paulo) which had been licensed for more than ten years before their licenses were cancelled by Dentel(A Comunicação, 1971, p.58).
15. Camargo, Communication Policies, p. 25.
16. Código Brasileiro de Telecomunicações. See also Decree-law no.236, of 28 February 1967.
17. Decree-law no.236, 28 February 1967.
18. Katz and Wedell, Broadcasting, p.75.
19. Camargo, Communication Policies, p.29
20. Roberto Amaral Vieira, "O Papel do Rádio e da Tevê na Formação da Cultura Brasileira ou da Macrocefália à Atomização," ABEPEC, no. 4 (June 1978) pp.34-47.
21. The building to house the Ministry of Communications was begun only in May 1973, in Brasília. Its first minister was Carlos Simas. The Ministry of Communications was established by Decree-law no.200, of 25 February 1967.

22. Katz and Wedell, Broadcasting, p.75.
23. Herbert I.Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire, p.33.
24. Camargo, Communication Policies, p.28. See also, J.de Nazaré T. Dias, A Reforma Administrativa de 1967, p.128; and Brazil para estudantes, special supplement to Veja, no.447(30 March 1977),p.8.
25. Euclides Quandt de Oliveira, Política de Comunicações, Pp.9-12, and 57.
26. Enjolras José de Castro Camargo, Estudo de Problemas Brasileiros, p.241.
27. Ibid. ,pp.242-259.
28. "A Comunicação entre as pessoas, agora é mais fácil," Brasil Para Estudantes, a special supplement of Veja,no.447(30 March 1977),p.10.
29. Embratel, Relatório da Diretoria, January 1977,p. 34.
30. Camargo, Communication Policies,Pp.28-29.
31. Embratel, Relatório, 1977,p.14.
32. Coriolano de Loiola Cabral Fagundes, Censura e Liberdade de Expressão, Pp.156-163. See also, Código Brasileiro de Telecomunicações.
33. Ernesto Geisel, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, 1976, p.100.
34. Geisel, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional,1977, Pp.143-144.
35. The Jornal do Brasil, in its so-called supplement B, on 29 April 1977, stated that Radio-bra~s was creating special programs in order to be broadcast toward African and Latin American countries. The Jornal do Brasil also says that in 1977 Brazil was making directional transmissions in three languages: Portuguese, English, and German, through the powerful 250 KW transmitters of the Rádio Nacional de Brasília, one of the stations of Radiobrás.
- 36.Katz and Wedell, Broadcasting, p.76.
37. World Communication: A 200 Country Survey of Press, Radio, Television, and Film, Pp.223-224.

Chapter 4

1. Emílio Garrastazu Médici, an army general, was the third president of the Revolutionary Movement. During his term in office, strong censorship was exercised and Institutional Act no.5 was passed, which provided the executive with unlimited powers of repression and was intensively used. The so-called Brazilian Economic Miracle, which contributed to the improvement of television, occurred during Médici's administration. Economic influences on the development of Brazilian television are discussed in Chapter 5.
2. Vigílio B.Noya Pinto, "Historical Development of Mass Communication in Brazil," in Communication Policies in Brazil, 1975, p.17_
3. Leslie Bethell, "Brazil: The Last 15 Years," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8,no.4(July-August 1979)pp.37. Discussing the political system, Bethell says that the Brazilian political system has always been to a greater or lesser extent closed. Notwithstanding the liberal democratic ideology which has found expression in successive constitutions since Brazil's independence from Portugal --1824, 1891, 1934, 1946-- and despite the gradual extension of the franchise during the Empire(1⁸²²-89), the Old Republic(1889-¹⁹³⁰), the period after the Revolution of 1930 and, above all, in the post-war period, the vast majority of Brazilians have been political subjects rather than active effective participants in national political life. Brazilian political culture,...is in fact deeply authoritarian, or at best paternalistic. The state even in the nineteenth century, but particularly since 1930, has been remote from civil society and highly bureaucratic. The dominant class, even while it has been transformed and somewhat broadened during recent decades of rapid economic and social change, has proved highly skilled at maintaining effective social and political control of the great mass of the Brazilian population(Pp.3-7).
4. Ibid.,1979,p.5
5. José Odelso Schneider, et al., RealidadeBrasileira, p.246.
6. Instituto de Planejamento Econômico e Social (IPEA), Brasil: 14 Anos de Revolução 1978,p.II.
7. Ibid.,p.II.
8. José Marques de Melo, Comunicação, Opinião, Desenvolvimento, p.37.
9. João Rodolfo do Prado, TV: Quem Vê Quem , Pp.139-140.
10. Thomas E.Weil et al., Area Handbook for Brazil,p. 265.
11. Melo, Comunicação, p.38.
12. Prado, TV , p.224.

13. Nely Camargo, and Virgílio B.Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil, p.31.
14. Ibid.,p.31.
15. Elihu Katz, and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance,p.34.
16. Euclides Quandt de Oliveira, minister of communications, Brazil, addressing the Fourth Centerwestern Congress of Broadcast on 18 May 1977,as reported in Jornal do Brasil, 20 May 1977.
17. Clovis Moura, "Climate of Terror," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8,no.4(July-August 1979), p.10.
18. Gerald Thomas, "Closely Watched TV," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8,no.4(July-August 1979) p.45.
19. Ibid.,p.45.

Chapter 5

1. Muniz Sodré, O Monopólio da Fala,p.86.
2. John P. Dickenson, Brazil: Studies in Industrial Geography, pp.8-11.
3. Muniz Sodré, A Comunicação do Grotesco, p.24
4. Gordon Campbell, Brazil Struggles for Development,p.16.
5. Nely Camargo, and Virgílio B.Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil,p.20.
6. Ibid.,p.41.
7. Campbell, Brazil, p.114.
8. Ibid.,p.85.
- 9.Thomas Pompeu de Souza Brasil Netto, Analysis of the Brazilian Economic Development,1973.
10. Campbell, Brazil, p.69.
11. The first multinational corporations(such as Ford, Armour, IBM, Firestone, and others) were established in Brazil before 1939. After 1964, multinational corporations practically controlled

the engineering, electrical, vehicle, and pharmaceutical industries in Brazil. See details in Dickenson Brazil: Studies in Industrial Geography, 1978.

12. Alan Wells, Picture: Tube Imperialism? The Impact of U.S. Television on Latin America, p.132.

13. Campbell, Brazil, p.110.

14. Joan R.Dassin, "Press Censorship: How and why," Index on Censorship: Brazil,8, no.4(July-August 1979)p.17.

15. Albert Fishlow, "Some Reflections on Post-1964 Brazilian Economic Policy," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed.Alfred Stepan, p.69. It should be noted that in the same book, in his article entitled "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," Alfred Stepan says that "since 1969, every ministry has had an SNI (National Information Service) representative, responsible for ensuring that all policy decisions of the ministry give full considerations to national security issues"(Pp.58-59).

16. Leslie Bethell, "Brazil: The Last 15 Years," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8, no.4(July-August 1979),p.4.

17. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated--Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed.Alfred Stepan, p.144.

18, World Advertising Expenditure,1978. It should be noted that the ten countries that spent over one billion dollars in advertising in 1976 were Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan,the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany.

19. Camargo, Communication Policies, p.20.

20. World Bank, World Development Report,1979.

21. Sodré, O Monopólio, p.91.

22. Emílio Garrastazu Médici, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, 1974,p.174.

23. Brazil's present day income distribution is better than before the 1964 revolution. However, Wayne A.Selcher says that "the 1970 census showed income more unevenly distributed by class than in 1960. Brazil's present income distribution can be likened to a small Sweden or Belgium inside a giant Indonesia; according to one characterization, about 5 million live at average European levels, about 15 million live at the standard of rich underdeveloped countries, and over 80 million live at a standard of living which is among Latin America's lowest"(The National Security Doctrine and Policies of the Brazilian Government,1977,p.13).

Chapter 6

1. Gordon Campbell, Brazil Struggles for Development, p. 83.
2. Elihu Katz, and George Wedell, Broadcasting in the Third World, p.75.
3. Nely Camargo, and Virgílio B. Noya Pinto, Communication Policies in Brazil, P.31.
4. See details about the utilization of mass media communication to promote national development in Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development,1973; and Everett M.Rogers, and F.Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations,1971.
5. João Rodolfo do Prado, TV: Quem Vê Quem, p.223.
6. See details in Everett M.Rogers,ed., Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives, 1976.
7. Gerald Thomas, "Closely Watched TV," Index on Censorship: Brazil, 8,no.4(July-August 1979) p.46.
8. Camargo, Communication Policies, p.65.
9. Herbert I.Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire, 1971,Pp.79-80.
10. "Além das Fronteiras," Veja, 10 January 1979,p.48.
11. Ibid.,p.48.
12. Ibid.,pp.48-50.

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