

**SÉRGIO MATTOS**

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
COMMUNICATION POLICIES  
UNDER THE PERUVIAN  
MILITARY GOVERNMENT  
(1968-1980)**

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(1968-1980)**

**By SÉRGIO MATTOS**

**WITH A FORWARD BY  
ALFRED H. SAULNIERS**

**San Antonio – Texas**

**1981**

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San Antonio, Texas – 78223  
U.S.A.

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Part of this study was presented at the meeting of Southwestern Council of Latin American Studies (SCVOLAS), Arlington, Texas, March 5-7, 1981.

Printed in the United States of America.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank Alfred Saulniers, Emile G. McAnany, Elizabeth Mahan, James Larsson, Jorge Reina Schement, and Rita Atwood for their very helpful comments on drafts of this study.



# Forward

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The Latin American state traditionally has played a much larger role in national economies than our own government has in the U.S. Peru's state is no exception. During the colonial period, while under Spanish rule, state control was particularly strong in the area of access to natural resources, commercial networks, or trade opportunities. In order to regulate the three areas of production, distribution and consumption, a variety of policy instruments was employed. These included land grants, loans or grants of funds or basic inputs to provide businesses, price controls, and government production monopolies.

The early years after Independence witnessed, for the most part, a continuation of such policies, with one substantial change – nationalism. The successive governments of the newly independent nation of Peru, even though preoccupied with simply staying in power, still dedicated a tremendous amount of effort to building a country with a strong economic footing. Protective tariffs, which favored local industry and agriculture, were introduced from the very beginning in a fashion which differed strongly from those imposed in the rest of the continent. In addition, the government used a series of other policy tools to foster domestic production. It invested in shares of private ventures designed to provide works of infrastructure; it promulgated buy-national policies for the branches of central government; it created a limited number of public enterprises; and it used its powers to charter banks and grant production or trade monopolies to build a stronger local economy.

With the advent of the guano boom<sup>1</sup> during the mid-nineteenth century, the situation changed somewhat. The various governments took advantage of

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<sup>1</sup> The Guano Boom refers to a period of stability and prosperity in Peru during the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. It was sustained on the substantial revenues generated by the export of guano and the strong leadership of president Ramón Castilla.

this natural resource, and later the nitrate deposits in Southern Peru to provide sources of needed revenue. No longer were they in the forefront of policy formulation, but rather reverted to a rentier status deriving income from the economic rents for exploitation rights, mostly coming from foreign producers. By the turn of the century, this had changed. The guano had become exhausted, the nitrates had been lost to Chile in the disastrous war of the Pacific, and the government production monopolies had been limited to opium, playing cards, coca and tobacco. Government was reduced to a small supportive role.

During the first decades of the twenty century, there was a return to the policies begun a century earlier. A series of sectoral development banks were created in the late twenties and thirties, principally to fund the projects of the private sector. The forties and fifties witnessed a slow increase in the scope of government activities. From the limited action of providing financial infrastructure, the Peruvian state expanded into providing industrial infrastructure. Thus, a small steel mill was set up; a minor petroleum producer was established; the merchant fleet was reorganized; and a firm was formed to run the airports.

It should be noted that the pace of growth in government activities truly increased under the first administration of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1962-1968). Massive emphasis was given to the creation of regional development authorities to deliver such basic services as water, sewage, housing, schools, markets, electricity, and farm-to-market roads for the population living in the “forgotten” areas of the country. In addition, there was continued growth in the steel mill, railroads, ports, electric companies and other basic infrastructure.

The most notable change in the role of the state occurred with the military governments of 1968-1980. Under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado and General Francisco Morales Bermúdez Cerruti, state presence in the economic and social life of the country increased to unprecedented levels in Peru. By any measure, the change was impressive. The number and economic weight of public enterprises rose; government production as a percentage of total production rose; government investment as a percentage of total investment rose; government exports as a percentage of total exports rose; government employment as a percentage of the economically active population rose. In all sectors, the state moved from

being a supporter of the private sector to taking a commanding role, guiding and determining the future of the country.

By 1976 the state investment portfolio had expanded from holding a few infrastructure-related firms in 1968 to include 48 public enterprises, 64 private firms in which the state was the only shareholder, 31 private firms in which the state held the majority of shares, and 31 others in which the state held a minority position. Certain basic principles guided the entrepreneurial action of the state: the state was to directly control trade in key exports and some imports including minerals, fishmeal and fish-oil; the state was to directly control production of basic industrial inputs including copper, iron, cement and chemicals; the state was to dominate air, sea and rail transport; the state was to provide basic social goods including foodstuffs; the state was to manufacture its own light arms and boats for the armed forces; the state was to have a major role in the information networks including advertising, radio, movies, television, and print; and the state would have a minor role in the rest of society including pari-mutuel betting and tourism.

Sérgio Mattos provides a remarkable study into one facet of the role of Peru's government during this period, communications policy. This was determined to be one of the key areas where needed state action was to intervene decisively. Such an interventionist policy derived from a host of motives: to foster support for the policies of the government; to stifle criticism of the various opposition groups; to counter the stronger foreign influences; and to create a national conscience. To this end, measures were taken to control all mass media including newspapers, radio and television.

In this work Sérgio Mattos examines the history of mass media in Peru tracing newspapers back to their colonial founding, radio back to the 1920's and television to the late 1950's. Later, he looks at the ideological underpinnings of the military government policies, focusing on officers' training programs through the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM). Finally, he provides an evaluation of the relative success of the changing policies applied from 1968 to 1980. In doing so, he fills a major gap in the literature on the role of the State during the Peruvian military governments of Generals Velasco and Morales Bermúdez.

These were not the only military leaders at the helm of the Peruvian state to concern themselves with the media. The first such case after independence is found in the Provisional Statutes of Government issued by General José de San Martín within a few weeks of the promulgation of Peruvian independence in 1821. In them, he guaranteed the freedom of the press. Ample evidence is found in the Decree elaborating on these statutes that the Liberator was well aware of the power of the means of communication:

Since the liberating art of printing was invented, the social sphere has experienced a beneficent revolution; surely, by developing talents and by helping genius escape from the darkness that frequently enveloped it, not only has the civilization of peoples increased, and many grave abuses been reformed, but it has wonderfully influenced the very destiny of nations and government. That of Peru, which desires nothing as much as the prosperity of the country whose destiny is entrusted to it, will authorize the freedom of the press because it recognizes the right which all men have to think, to speak and to write, and because it is convinced that without it the best talents for the cause of reason and clarity are lost to the Fatherland.<sup>2</sup>

These principles, restated in the successive Constitutions, determined the relation of government to the mass media for most of the first 150 years of Peruvian independence. During the military governments of General Velasco and Morales Bermúdez, a new rationale was employed – control of the mass media to form and mold public opinion, to provide outlets for new power groups, and to reduce the influence of the previously entrenched power elite.

Current events indicate a major shift in direction for the state's role in communications during the eighties, a shift back to those original

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<sup>2</sup> Decree of October 13, 1821, in *Gaceta Del Gobierno de Lima Independiente*, October 17m 1921, (fac. ed.)(July 1821 – December 1822), 3 vols. In 1 (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1950), pp. 133-134.

principles. It is thus useful to pause and reflect on the costs and benefits of the experiment of the past twelve years. Sérgio Mattos has provided us such and opportunity.



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**THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION POLICIES  
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# INTRODUCTION

On October 3, 1968, the Peruvian constitutional government of President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-1968) was replaced by a Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces under the leadership of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, who had a program of social reform. General Velasco's term in office (1968-1975) – the first phase of the Peruvian military dictatorship – was characterized by radical measures in the socioeconomic, political, and cultural environments. These measures included nationalization and/or expropriation of branches of foreign corporations, reform of national private enterprises, agricultural reform, press reforms, and the formulation of specific policies for mass communication media.

The second phase of the military regime, characterized by inflation and economic recession, was led by General Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-1980), who realized his goal of restoring the democratic process in Peru. In May, 1980, popular elections were held and the “final results sealed the victory of Belaúnde, with 43.6% of the total votes”<sup>3</sup>; and, on July 28<sup>th</sup>, 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry was inaugurated for his second term in office.

This is not the place to undertake a detailed exposition of the structure and development of the Peruvian Revolution, which was completely different from other South American military coups<sup>4</sup> because it postulated a particular model of social development. However, Nora Hamilton best explains the differences as follows:

The [Peruvian] military officers who took control of the state in 1968 carried out a series of reforms designed to eliminate institutions blocking capitalist development and attempted to lessen Peru's dependence through expropriation of foreign holdings in the major export sectors, stringent controls on new foreign investments, and state control of basic industries. At the same time, in an effort to stimulate rapid development, they sought

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<sup>3</sup> Martin Poblete, “Belaúnde Elected in Peru,” in *Hemispherica*, Vol. XXIX, n. 5, May 1980, p.4.

<sup>4</sup> For a philosophical and historical discussion of the Peruvian Revolution and other different types of military coups in Latin America, the reader is directed to Alfred Stepan's book, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*. Princeton University Press, 1979.

foreign loans, which were readily forthcoming in view of Peru's copper and fishmeal resources and the evidence of substantial petroleum reserves. [...] In contrast, the policies of the military regime which took power in Brazil in 1964 deliberately favored foreign capital and those national enterprises linked to it at the expense of less efficient domestic firms.<sup>5</sup>

Between 1968 and 1980, the Peruvian mass media underwent a series of innovative reforms as a direct consequence of the new laws, decrees, and regulatory agencies established by the military government. One of the most radical changes promoted by Peruvian institutional military dictatorship was the expropriation of newspapers, and radio and television stations.

Mass media was not among the top priorities of the new ruling junta initially, but shortly after the 1968 coup the military leaders realized that controlling and restructuring press institutions was essential to promote social, cultural, and economic reforms, and was an efficient way to stifle criticism as well.

After only 14 months in power, Velasco's regime moved against the press institution by enacting the first "Press Law" (1969) which gave the military government the right to control content. This measure also stimulated self-censorship among newspaper editors. The first two newspaper expropriations occurred in 1971. During the same year major ownership shares of the private broadcast media were also expropriated. A primary motivation for this intervention stemmed from the fact that the most powerful print and broadcast enterprises were owned by Peruvian elites who were associated with powerful foreign interests. Thus, General Velasco's government moved against the Peruvian broadcast media in order to "take over the television service, to exert decisive influence in the field of radio, and to nationalize the telecommunications services operated

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<sup>5</sup> HAMILTON, Nora. *Possibilities and Limits of State Autonomy in Latin American Countries*, paper for presentation at the 8th National Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, April 5-7, 1979, Pp. 25-26.

until then by ITT, AT & T, the Swedish Ericsson Company, and a group of Swiss Banks”.<sup>6</sup>

Scant attention has been given by communication researchers to mass media in Peru. The work that has been done generally focuses on the history of the Peruvian mass media, its structure, audience, program formats, etc., thus frequently overlooking the historical, political, and socioeconomic environment in which the growth, products, and changes of the Peruvian mass media are processed. With this in mind, a study that attempts to examine, identify, and describe the efforts of the Peruvian military regime to create its own mass media communication model (which is considered as an effort toward a new information order) can be an important contribution to our knowledge of the Peruvian mass media development.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine and describe the activities of the Peruvian military regime with regard to the mass media. The study will attempt to answer three primary research questions:

- 1- What were the primary factors which influenced the development of communication policies under the Peruvian military regime?
- 2- What were the major mass media policies adopted by the Peruvian military regime?
- 3- What were the influences of the Peruvian military ideology, and the “Plan of the Revolutionary Government” on the elaboration of the Peruvian Communication Policies?

Data for this study were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources were principally official documents and speeches by Peruvian Presidents, ministers, and spokesmen for the military regime. Data collection has been hampered somewhat by the cultural and ideological biases which were found in literature on Peruvian mass media by both US and Latin American researchers. Data on Peruvian mass media should be interpreted with caution because it remains scattered, conflicting, and sometimes suspect.

In taking all the above facts into account, the scope of this research must be limited to an examination of the development of communication policies

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<sup>6</sup> KATZ, Elihu, and WEDELL, George. *Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and Performance*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977, P.74.

under the Peruvian military government. Considering that communication policies cannot be studied or understood as units isolated from the historical, political and socioeconomic systems in which they operate and are implemented, this study tries to provide the reader with a broader understanding of the development of communication policies under the Peruvian military regime. In order to do that this book is divided into five parts: 1) Introduction; 2) Historical Background of Peruvian Mass Media; 3) The Peruvian Revolution, Its Ideology and Goals in Relation to Mass Media; 4) The Peruvian Communication Policies; and 5) Discussion and Suggestions.

# History of the Peruvian mass media

The purpose of this section is to present a brief historical background of the growth and dissemination of Peruvian mass media – newspapers, radio and television. This chapter, which is divided into three subsections, provides the reader with a general idea about the development of Peruvian mass media before and during the military regime. Through the summary of the early history presented in this section, the reader can verify ownership structure of the Peruvian mass media before the 1968 Revolution and how this ownership was strongly affected by subsequent Peruvian government policies. The first subsection is about newspapers, the second is about radio, and the last one is about television.

## PERUVIAN NEWSPAPERS

*El Mercurio Peruano* was the country's first newspaper. It was established in 1791 by a group of intellectuals. During the independence period, many other journals were established with the same format and content as *El Mercurio Peruano*. However, they were short-lived ventures. Within the long tradition of Peruvian journalism, newspapers were always used by political groups or by members of the oligarchy in order to exert influence, in the election of candidates for example or exert pressure on the government. In most cases those newspapers were closed “when the candidates or groups that had inspired their establishment lost an election or when their creators... died or lost interest”.<sup>7</sup>

One of the exceptions to the above case of short-lived newspaper is *El Comercio*.<sup>8</sup> It was founded in May, 1839, by Manuel Amunátequi (Chilean)

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<sup>7</sup> Thomas E. Weill, ET AL, *Area Handbook for Peru*, Washington: Foreign Area Studies the American University, 1972, p. 169.

<sup>8</sup> Luis Peirano ET AL, *Prensa: Apertura y Limites*, Lima: Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo (DESCO), 1976, pp. 12-15. See also Juan Gaeurevich, *Mito y Verdad de los Diarios de Lima*, Lima: Editorial Grafica Labor, 1972, p. 9. See also Helán Jaworski, “Towards a New Information Order: Rural Participation in the Peruvian Press”, in *Developmen Dialogue*, 1979, p.130. Jaworski says that: “El Comercio employs more than 600 workers many of then working shifts in the different sections. Its daily edition is divided into two separate parts running into a total of 32 to 50 pages, rising to a total of 64 to 70 pages on Sundays and reaching 80 pages for advertising campaigns”.

and Alejandro Villota (Argentinean). Forty years later, *El Comercio* was under the control of the Antonio Miró Quesada.

The growth and dissemination of the press, the elite medium, has been intense, and the circulation of newspapers has doubled despite Peru's three languages (Spanish, Quechua, and Aymara) and a high level of illiteracy. Peru has more than 70 daily newspapers, but many of them are small and provincial papers with a limited circulation<sup>9</sup>, due to the low literacy rate of the Peruvian population<sup>10</sup>. See Table I in order to verify the growth of Peruvian population.

**TABLE I**  
**GROWTH OF PERUVIAN POPULATION**

Year	Population in million
1969	13.1
1975	15.5
1976	15.9
1977	16.4
1878	16.8
1979	17.3

Sources: *Peru in Figures*, Banco Continental, Peru: Lima. See also *World Development Report*, 1979, World Bank, August, 1979.

It is important to note that Peru is “a country that reads little and with a high illiteracy rate. The national dailies, which are aimed exclusively at the middle classes, were mostly the property of small circles, of families in some instances”.<sup>11</sup>

It should be noted that before the 1968 Revolution, Peruvian newspapers (See Table II) were owned by a few wealthy individuals and their families: “One study shows that of the eight main dailies in Lima, two belongs to a group of a large farm owners; two are the properties of two inter-locked groups of merchants and industrialists; one belongs to a family that owns a

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<sup>9</sup> Gregory Henderson, et al, *Public Diplomacy and Political Change*, Gregory Henderson, Ed., New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 214-215.

<sup>10</sup> Peru's population is made up of three main groups: Indians (about 50 percent of the population), whites (13 percent), and mestizos (mixed white and indian, 37 percent), plus small number of persons from Japan, China and Africa. The Indians speak Quechua or Aymara as their first language.

<sup>11</sup> Helán Jaworski, 1979, p. 120.

large bank, cement factories, insurance companies, and a petroleum concern; and one belongs to a magnate of the fish-flour industry who also owns a chain of provincial newspapers and a number of specialized magazines. Some newspapers owners also own television networks and radio stations”.<sup>12</sup>

The above situation started to be changed when, in 1971, two newspapers (*Expreso* and *Extra*) were expropriated by the State. After an experiment of three years of control of these two newspapers, General Velasco’s government promulgated, in July of 1974, a new “Press Law”, through which newspapers with nation-wide circulation were expropriated. By means of that law together with the regulation that promoted the “reform of enterprises”, the military government had the intention of promoting the socialization of the Peruvian press. This was done by establishing the principle of co-management in the largest Peruvian newspapers through which “the worker’s right to participate in the ownership, management and benefits of enterprises was recognized.<sup>13</sup> Thus, newspapers were transferred to the existent organizations of the population<sup>14</sup>, with the distribution as follows:

*El Comercio* to the rural organizations; *La Prensa* to the work communities; *Correo* to the professional associations; *Ojo* to the cultural organizations; *Expreso* to the educational bodies; and *Ultima Hora* to the service organizations (an ambiguous, generic term that comprised banking, first-and second-degree cooperatives and social property enterprises). The government kept *El Peruano* as its gazette or official daily, limited strictly to legal and administrative information, and converted *La Cronica* into a government newspaper, entirely subsidized and without advertising.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Henderson, et al, 1973, p.217.

<sup>13</sup> Jaworski, 1979, p. 124.

<sup>14</sup> Carlos Ortega and Carlos Romero, Communication Policies in Peru, Unesco, 1977, p. 31.

<sup>15</sup> Jaworsky, 1979, p. 123.

**TABLE II**  
**Ownership of Newspapers in Peru**  
**(before and after expropriation)**

It was property of	Name of the Newspaper	It was distributed with the following organized groups of the society
Miró Queda's family	<i>El Comercio</i>	Rural organizations
Luis Banchero's group	<i>Correo</i>	Professional groups
Luis Banchero's group	<i>Ojo</i>	Cultural organizations
Ulloa's group	<i>Expresso and Extra</i>	Educational bodies
Prado's family	<i>La Cronica and La Tercera</i>	Government
Beltran's group	<i>La Prensa</i>	Work communities
Beltran's group	<i>Ultima Hora</i>	Services organizations

Sources: Jaworski, 1979, p. 123; Peirano, 1976, p. 19; Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 33-34.

The intentions of General Velasco's government behind the socialization of the newspapers in Peru have been the target of many conflicting hypotheses. Some critics have pointed out that one of his major intentions was to stifle criticism against the government's economic and social programs which had affected oligarchy interests directly, as well as the interests of foreign groups to which the elite was linked. The argument is based on countless factors; one of the most common is the fact that even socialized newspapers did not have complete autonomy, because the government exerted direct control by means of censorship to silence the oppositions, and by naming the members of the board of directors of the newspapers.

On the other hand, other scholars have raised some points in defense of Velasco's good will. Helán Jaworski, for instance, is one who defends Velasco's press reform toward press socialization. He says that:

Socialization had not been carried out in order to "silence the opposition", as the opposition claimed. The President received constant complaints from ministers and head of public bodies about the criticisms they had received during the first year of socialization. Nonetheless he [Velasco] kept on going forward. He

[Velasco] knew what he wanted: A real transfer of power, as proposed by his government, in order to implement a “social democracy of full participation.”<sup>16</sup>

With the transformation of the communication media structures would be given to the people the right to be well informed and to take part in the news-making process, through their organizations. However, one can assume that Velasco’s intentions were not completely carried out, because in July 1978, during the second stage of the Peruvian Revolution, President Morales Bermudez enacted another decree law, which contributed to opening the road to the return of those newspapers to their former owners. In short, that decree allowed that the capital of the newspaper enterprises may be acquired: up to 25 percent by the former proprietors who were expropriated; another 25 percent by the workers on the dailies; and the remaining 50 percent to be sold on the stock exchange, in such a way that no one person should acquire more than 5 percent.<sup>17</sup>

One of the main reasons for this shift was the fact that the method through which the government tried to socialize the major newspapers was not working because “the popular organizations were not ready to accept their responsibility”.<sup>18</sup>

However, it was not the only reason. One can assume that the method of socialization of the newspapers was not working very well due to the increase of control exerted by the government. For instance, on August 29<sup>th</sup>, 1975, when General Velasco was replaced by General Morales Bermudez as President of the country, the National Information System (SINADI) was controlling not only the expropriated newspapers, but also radio and TV stations, whose directors were being appointed by the Central Information Office (OCI) – the executive branch of SINADI, which will be separately discussed in the section number four. In addition, one can recall internal economic changes as complementary reasons:

in the 1968-1974 period Peru experienced rapid economic growth and price stability. Most of the social reforms were carried out during this period – e.g. reforms in land tenure, industry, mining, fishing,

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<sup>16</sup> Jaworski, 1979, pp. 133-134.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 1979, p.125.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 1979, p. 124.

education, [press]. The years 1975-1980 are characterized by substantial difficulties. Inflation has been growing constantly and at the same time the economy stagnated, and in the later years a considerable economic recession took place.<sup>19</sup>

## PERUVIAN RADIO STATIONS

The first Peruvian radio station, Peruvian Broadcast Company, was inaugurated in June 20, 1925, by President Augusto Bernardino Leguía.<sup>20</sup> According to Juan Gargurevich<sup>21</sup>, this station, which had its name changed to Radio Nacional, was established by Cesar Coloma, Fernando Carbajal, Santiago Acuna, Paul Vidmer, and Henry Ford. Gargurevich also points out that not until 1935 were other radio stations established in Peru.

Since the establishment of the second radio station in 1935, the growth and dissemination of sound broadcast (radio) was intense in Peru. According to figures for 1979, there were 222 radio stations throughout the Peruvian territory, where there are also about 3.5 million radio receivers serving more than 17 million people<sup>22</sup> (See Table III in order to see the distribution and concentration of radio stations in Peru). Despite the large number of radio stations in Peru, only three stations have had an audience of significant proportions. Radio Nacional is one of the most listened to stations in Peru.

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<sup>19</sup> Werner Baer, and Adolfo Figueroa, *Equity and State Enterprises: Reflections Based on the Cases of Brazil and Peru*, unpublished paper, no date, p. 16.

<sup>20</sup> Augusto Bernardino Leguía was known as a paternal dictator. He was President of Peru during 1908-1912 and 1919-1930. In his second term in office Leguía promulgated, in 1920, a new Constitution.

<sup>21</sup> Juan Gargurevich, Introduction a La Historia de los Medios de Comunicación em El Peru, Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1977, pp. 106-107.

<sup>22</sup> It should be noted that according to Domenico Serafini's report on Peru, "Broadcasting in South America: Business and Modernization is the Future, Politics is Present", published in *Television/Radio Age International*, September 1979, pp. A40-A42: "Lima has 38 stations – 34 AM and four FM. The government-owned Radio Nacional de Peru, operated 15 radio stations, of which eight are cultural and 12 are shortwave stations. Only three, however, have significant audiences".

**TABLE III**  
**Distribution and Concentration of TV**  
**and Radio Stations in Peru**  
**(Situation in 1968)**

Radio Stations			TV Stations					
Type of station	Location Lima Provinces		Total	%	Location Lima Provinces		Total	%
State	01	04	05	2	01	-	01	5
Cultural	-	08	08	3	01	-	01	5
Commercial/ Private	34	175	209	95	04	13	17	90
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>06</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100</b>

Sources: Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 36-37; Gargurevich, 1977,

Generally speaking one can say that the manner in which the first Peruvian radio stations were established does not differ from the way they were established throughout the Latin American countries. According to Elihu Katz and George Wedell:

Radio Broadcasting in Peru, however, rather than being established under cultural auspices, was from its inception a tinker's trade. [...] The stations were openly commercial in those early days, and government control was minimal. Since in South and Central America business were often owned and operated by local oligarchies, the ownership of broadcasting also came to be concentrated in the hands of a few rich families and partnerships. Networks of radio stations were built up, the largest of which survive to this days.<sup>23</sup>

The above situation was possible due to the fact that before the 1968 revolution, the government had acted "as a mere issuer of licenses and supervisor of technical aspects".<sup>24</sup> In addition, there was not a guiding state

<sup>23</sup> Katz, and Wendell, 1977, p.71.

<sup>24</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 37.

policy, and this was responsible among other things for the concentration of ownership in the hands of a few persons or corporations.<sup>25</sup>

Summarizing, one can say that, before the 1968 military take over, the sector of the radio broadcast presented had, among others, the following characteristics:

- a) There were 222 radio stations in the country and only 5 of them were state-owned;
- b) There was not regulation to control program content or amount of time reserved to advertising;
- c) There was a high index of imported programs, principally radiodramas and music;
- d) Radio broadcasting was the most important vehicle of communication because it could reach most of the population;
- e) Because of the high illiteracy rate, a large portion of the population was dependent on radio for news; and,
- f) There was a concentration of radio stations on the urban coastal area of the country.<sup>26</sup>

After the 1968 revolution, the military government introduced radical changes into the Peruvian radio broadcast sector when it enacted the Telecommunications Law in 1971. It should be noted that this law will be separately discussed in chapter four. In short, after the promulgation of the Telecommunications Law the government ordered expropriation of 25 percent of the shares of more than a dozen radio stations and announced that, under the law, broadcasts would have a social significance and would be placed at the service of the public interest.<sup>27</sup>

With the expropriation of the equity of certain radio stations the military regime changed the ownership structure of the Peruvian radio broadcast, and increased its participation on this sector:

In 1971, the State controlled only 2 percent of the sound broadcasting stations; but this percentage has now

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 1977, p.37.

<sup>26</sup> Gargurevitich, 1977, p. 118. See also Thomas E. Weil et al, 1972, p. 171.

<sup>27</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 156.

reached [1977] 20 percent of which 15 percent are associate State stations and 5 percent State stations.<sup>28</sup>

Moreover, one can point out as important changes the facts that the telecommunications Law determined: a reduction of imported radio programs; a reduction of time reserved to advertising; an increase of the time allocated to the broadcasting of Peruvian cultural/educational programs ; and reserved the ownership of radio station only for Peruvian born. Another point that must be considered as relevant is the fact that by means of the Telecommunications Law the military regime created conditions for exerting direct control over the program contents at the same time that it established that “educational programs were to be subject to the control and approval of the Ministry of Education”.<sup>29</sup>

As will be seen in the following subsection, the changes introduced by the military regime on the television sector were more radical than those introduced in the radio broadcasting sector.

## **PERUVIAN TELEVISION**

Peruvian television was established on January 17, 1958, as result of an agreement between the Peruvian Ministry of Education and UNESCO. Established during President Manuel Prado’s (1956-1962) term in office<sup>30</sup>, the first Peruvian TV-station was an “educational experiment inspired by UNESCO”<sup>31</sup> , broadcasting over channel 7. According to Katz and Wedell the Peru/UNESCO’s TV-educational experiment “was rapidly and all but silenced by largest entrepreneurs in radio broadcasting who opened commercial stations in Lima”<sup>32</sup>. It is important to note that, in the same year (1958) that the TV-educational experiment was established, a commercial television station, “Televisora America” (the second Peruvian TV-station), was broadcasting over channel 4, “using the 525/60 standard system M”<sup>33</sup>. Like other Latin America countries, Peruvian commercial

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<sup>28</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 50.

<sup>29</sup> Weil et AL, 1972, pp. 156-173.

<sup>30</sup> Juan Gargurevich Regal, “El Estado y la Television – Peru”, in *Nueva Politica*, Vol. 1, nº 3 (July-Sept., 1976), p. 128.

<sup>31</sup> Katz and Wedell, 1977, p. 10.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. , 1977,p. 10.

<sup>33</sup> Serafini, 1979, p. A42. In addition, Ortega and Romero, 1977, classified the Peruvian television in relation to the number of stations distribution in Peru’s territory. They indicate that: “of a total of fifty [TV] stations (broadcasting and repeaters stations) seventeen located in Lima so that 34 percent are in

television was established and based on the United States model. In addition, it was “characterized by (1) private ownership and heavy concentration of media wealth in the hands of a few, (2) too many urban-centered local stations, and (3) dependence on advertising”.<sup>34</sup>

Summarizing, one can say that before the 1968 military revolution, Peruvian television had, among others, the following characteristics:

- a) Like newspapers and radio stations, Peruvian television channels’ ownership was also in the hands of a few groups. That is, before 1968, “five families controlled more than 13 of the 19 television channels”<sup>35</sup> (See concentration of ownership on Table IV);
- b) By 1968 the government controlled only five percent of the Peruvian TV-stations (see Table III);
- c) Peruvian television was used as a political tool not only by political parties, but also by Peruvian economic elites, who were associated with foreign corporations, in order to exert pressure to obtain favors and maintain the status quo;
- d) The government was confined to oversee technical conditions to be followed by the concessionaires of TV channels;
- e) There was not any regulation related to program content or limitation of time reserved to advertising; and
- f) There was a high index of imported-canned-programs, principally from the United States.

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the capital and 66 percent in the provinces. The television services operates in sixteen of the twenty-three departments, i.e., 70 percent of the departments have this service.”

<sup>34</sup> Chi-Chuan Lee, *Media Imperialism Reconsidered*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980, p. 93.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 1980, p. 94.

**TABLE IV**  
**Ownership of Television and Radio Stations in Peru**  
**(Before expropriation)**

Power Group	Company Title	TV	Radio	Total
Cavero's family	Cadena Nacional SA Empresa Radiodifusora Victoria SA Radio Selecta	-	26	26
Delgado's family	Radio Tele AS Panamericana Television SA, CRU	07	07	14
Belmont's group & family	Bego Television SA (channel 11) Radio Atalaya, Radio 1160 Radio Excelsior	01	03	04
Gonzalez-Umbert's group	Cia. Peruana de Radiodifusión SA Radio Continental SA Emissoras Nacionales AS	05	05	10

Sources: Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 38; and Juan Gargurevich, 1976, p. 132. It should be noted that both sources present similar table to the above one.

The above situation began to be changed when “The revolutionary Government, under an elaborate and ambitious General Law of Telecommunications formulated in 1971, has expropriated major ownership of private television but accomplished very little in the way of harnessing the media to the revolutionary causes”.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Lee, 1980, p. 94.

With the expropriation of “51 percent of the equity of any television stations”<sup>37</sup>, the military regime promoted a radical change on the ownership structure of Peruvian television, and at the same time it increased its participation on this sector of mass media communication:

While in 1971 the State controlled only 5 percent of the television stations, following the application of the General Telecommunications Law the State controls 95 percent of the stations directly and the remaining educational stations (5 percent) indirectly, so that we [Carlos Ortega and Carlos Romero] can assert that at the present time [1977] the State has total control of television broadcasting.<sup>38</sup>

Moreover, one can point out as important changes the facts that through the General Law of Telecommunications, which will be separately discussed on the chapter four, the military government: regulated the ownership structure of Peruvian TV stations, establishing three categories for TV-broadcasting, that is, TV – stations can be State-owned, State-associated, or private. The Velasco’s regime also determined an increase on the production and transmission of local programs, limiting the imported ones. The advertising time was also limited to 20 percent of the total number of hours broadcast per day.<sup>39</sup> Other effects of the military regime on TV broadcasting will be shown in chapter four, where the creation and establishment of laws and regulatory agencies will be discussed.

In concluding this subsection, one can say that since its establishment in 1958, Peruvian television has shown continual growth. According to figures for 1979, there are 600,000 TV-sets in Peru. This represents 34 sets per 1,000 people.<sup>40</sup> In addition, Domenico Serafini claims that “television is one of Peru’s fastest growing industries”, and that “public investment in

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<sup>37</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 125.

<sup>38</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 50.

<sup>39</sup> See Ortega and Romero, 1977; Weil et al, 1972/ Katz and Wedell, 1977; and, Gargurevich, 1977.

<sup>40</sup> “World TV Set Count”, in *Television/Radio Age International*, September, 1979, p. A81. In addition, see Domenico Serafini, p. A42, in the same issue, because he says that only “345,500 TV-sets are in use including 270,000 in Lima”. According to Serafini’s data, there are only “20 sets per 1,000 people” in Peru.

communication during the 1975-1978 period amounted to \$100 million.<sup>41</sup> Serafini also summarizes the state of television in Peru in this way:

Today [1979] there are four operating TV stations in the country. Channel 7, Empresa Nacional de Radiodifusión del Peru (ENRAD) is noncommercial and is operated by the Ministry of Education in Lima, the capital and the country's largest city. The government...[also] holds 66 percent of the capital of Telecentro, a joint venture established in 1973 to control the production and purchase of all television programs. Panamerican television (Channel 5) with stations in nine cities, is Peru's largest TV network, followed by Channel 4, with seven TV repeaters. Radio Continental TV (Channel 6) operates from Arequipa and utilizes two repeaters.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Serafini, 1979, p. A42. It should be noted that in the same Page, Serafini also says that: "television stations broadcast on the average 14 hours daily and, indeed, have a strong appeal to Peruvians. It is not unusual to find TV antennas protruding in the midst of financially depressed areas. For many, television is also a useful investment, since it is an accepted practice for owners to charge less than five cents (U.S.) to watch nightly TV".

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 1979, p. A42.

# **The Peruvian Revolution, its Ideology and Goals in relation to Mass Media**

To understand the Peruvian communication policies, through which the State exerted direct control and promoted radical reforms on mass media, one must understand the Peruvian military ideology and the Plan of the Revolutionary Government. The ideology and the Plan of the military dictatorship (1968-1980) provided them with the necessary mechanisms to increase State control and to impose its reforms on the socioeconomic, political, and cultural system of the country. This chapter presents in a general way the Peruvian military ideology and the Plan of the Revolutionary Government, paying particular attention to the points which are related to mass media communications.

## **THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS**

Most of the philosophy which guided the Peruvian Military government was an intellectual result of the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), which is “referred to as the fountainhead of the thought that produced the Peruvian Revolution”.<sup>43</sup> In CAEM, the students were taught that there is a direct relation between internal security and the promotion of national development. It should be noted that: “originally devoted to traditional military subjects, CAEM’s curriculum has expanded in recent years to include extensive study of Peru’s development problems and the military’s role in their solution. Economic planning and national integration mingled with more traditional military instruction in discipline, honor, duty, efficiency, and participation”.<sup>44</sup>

A reason for this shift, it can be inferred, was the USA military policy toward Latin America during early 60’s. According to Alfred Stepan, that policy encouraged “the Latin American militaries to assume as their primary role counterinsurgency programs, civic-action and nation-building

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<sup>43</sup> Henderson, 1973, p. 206.

<sup>44</sup> Henderson, 1973, p. 206. In addition, Thomas Weil et al, 1972, p. 355, say that: “The CAEM has made valuable contributions to the development of the country through studies involving the settlement of the central selva and sociological economic studies of the country’s various zones... The army’s highest technical school was the Superior War School (the Peruvian general staff College), which had been graduating classes since 1935.”

tasks”.<sup>45</sup> As a result of the United States military policy toward Latin American countries, the military institutions began to study such questions: “as the social and political conditions facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and to develop doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements. As a result, these highly professionalized armies became much more concerned with political problems”.<sup>46</sup> As an example of this, Stepan points out the Brazilian and Peruvian armies.

It can be assumed that the Revolution of 1968 was a direct result of the Peruvian military studies involving the social and political conditions of the country. The Revolutionary leaders had a program of social and economic reforms, such as “The change of the liberal economic system towards one with State intervention.”<sup>47</sup> Werner Baer and Adolfo Figueroa explain that the logic adopted by the military regime’s policies

was that income distribution depends upon the distribution of property among individuals. Due to the high concentration of the means of production, a basic change in the distribution of income would come from a change in the property structure. In addition, the military government considered that capitalism in Peru had failed to bring social progress and, therefore, the economic system should be changed to a more pluralistic economy, with other forms of ownership besides private property.<sup>48</sup>

Ortega and Romero argue that the Peruvian Revolution was an independent movement to promote a socioeconomic reform, in order to increase the social participation of Peruvians “in the exercise of social power within a truly sovereign national community”.<sup>49</sup>

Ortega and Romero say also that “the Peruvian Revolution is Nationalist and Independent and doctrinally takes its stand on a Revolutionary

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<sup>45</sup> Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion”, in *Authoritarian Brazil*, Alfred Stepan, ed., New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973, p. 52

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 1973, p. 50.

<sup>47</sup> Werner Baer, and Adolfo Figueroa, no date, p. 6.

<sup>48</sup> Werner Baer, and Adolfo Figueroa, no date, p.7.

<sup>49</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 63-64.

Humanism explicitly opposed alike to systems of social exploitation and to those of totalitarian and dogmatic nature. It therefore rejects both the capitalist and communist systems".<sup>50</sup>

Summarizing, one can say that the 1968 Peruvian Revolution was based on a hightoned spirit of Nationalism, Independence, and Humanism. That is, the military leaders tried to use:

- a) **Nationalism**, to defend the sovereignty of Peru, promoting not only national development and national security but also Peruvian culture, values, traditions, and creativity;
- b) **Independence**, to eliminate all form of political, economic, or military dependence; and,
- c) **Humanism**, to construct a new society, promoting social participation, solidarity, and justice, through the rejection of all forms of exploitation, domination, and oligarchy.<sup>51</sup>

Ortega and Romero say that:

The Peruvian Revolution lays down as its final objective the construction of a social democracy with full participation whose essential elements are as follows: a) A participatory political system grounded in the masses. b) A pluralist economic system based on a priority sector of social ownership; c) A social system upheld by a combination of components and moral values stressing justice, freedom, work, participation, solidarity, creativity, integrity and respect for human dignity.<sup>52</sup>

How can these three main values (Nationalism. Independence, and Humanism) of the Peruvian Revolution be related to the changes wrought by the military regime in the area of mass media? As it will be shown throughout this study, the military regime tried not only to nationalize the Peruvian mass media but also to make it independent from foreign connections and from oligarchic exploitation (by limiting the imported

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 1977, p. 64.

<sup>51</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 63-66.

<sup>52</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 66.

programs, and by expropriating ownership of mass media, etc.). In relation to the third value, Humanism, one can claim that the military regime recognized, among other things, the worker's right to participate in the ownership, management, and benefits of mass media. In short, "the determination of the government to bring its ideas and aspirations to all sectors of the society was reflected in a number of measures adopted to extend controls over the mass media."<sup>53</sup>

## THE PLAN FOR COMMUNICATIONS

This subsection introduces an overview of the objectives of the Peruvian Revolutionary Government for communications by quoting chapter 24 of the "Plan of the Revolutionary Military Government" (Plan del Gobierno Revolucionario de la Fuerza Armada, or El Plan Inca), which describes the former situation, outlines the objectives of the revolution regarding mass media, and defines the actions which should be taken:

### 24. Freedom of the Press

(a) **Situation.** (1) There is no press freedom in the country but only publishers' freedom. (2) The organs of the press are the property of powerful families and groups. (3) News is abridged, suppressed or stressed in accordance with the interests of the owners of the press organs. (4) The morality and honor of person and institutions are attacked with impunity. (5) Foreigners are permitted to own and operate organs of the press.

(b) **Objectives.** (1) An authentically free press which will guarantee to all Peruvians the expression of their ideas and respect personal honor and public morality. (2) The organs of the press will be exclusively in the hands of representative organizations of the new society.

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<sup>53</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 156

(c) **Action.** (1) Peruvianize the press. (2) Ensure the responsible and free expression of ideas. (3) Guarantee respect for persons and institutions. (4) Promote the training and further training of journalists with a new mentality. (5) Place the organs of the press in the hands of the representative organs of the new society.<sup>54</sup>

As can be observed, the Inca Plan seems to have foreseen the expropriation of newspapers, at least on the official version of the Plan, which was only divulged in 1974. Juan Gargurevich says that there are doubts in relation to the origin of the version of the Plan known in 1974. He says this because the Plan seems to have been rewritten to adjust it to the political moment in which the Plan was revealed. Gargurevich also argues that President Velasco only revealed the existence of the Inca Plan when revolutionary euphoria was in its highest level. According to Gargurevich, Velasco had said that the Inca Plan had been elaborated by the original group that withdrew President Fernando Belaúnde in 1968, but it was not revealed before for strategic reasons.<sup>55</sup>

Despite this, the Inca Plan is considered one of the most important documents of the 1968 Revolution because most, if not all policies of the military government, were derived from it, including the communication policies. According to Luis Rocca Torres<sup>56</sup>, all Peruvian laws related to communication sectors were enacted in accordance with the Plan of the Revolutionary Military Government.

It is important to say that, according to that Plan, the communication sectors have the following objectives: “To develop, under State control, a system of communications to ensure the social and economic development of the country, contribute to integration and guarantee national defense”.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, one can say that the Peruvian model of mass media is an attempt to adopt the communication systems to the objectives of a military

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<sup>54</sup> Plan Del Gobierno Revolucionario de La Fuerza Armada, comité de Asesoramiento de La Presidencia, Ed., Lima: Editora Universo AS., 1974, Chapter 24. See also Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 29-30.

<sup>55</sup> Juan Gargurevich, 1977, pp. 84-85.

<sup>56</sup> Torres, 1975, pp. 55-58. See also Ortega and Romero, 1977, pp. 39-41.

<sup>57</sup> Torres, 1975, p. 56.

government, objectives based on concern for improving specific conditions of the country. As Katz and Wedell point out:

They wanted to expel the multinational companies as quickly as possible, to speed land reform and to improve transportation, to give workers policymaking and profit-sharing roles in the industry and commerce, and to incorporate the Indians (46 percent of the population) socially and culturally into the mainstream of the society.

[...]

Following the coup of 1968, the military junta acted for the first time in the name of the lower classes and the indigenous population rather than the elite and the Europeans. It proclaimed a socialist policy of nationalization, rapid modernization, and the mobilization of the heretofore unintegrated majority for political participation.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Katz and Wedell, ps. 15 and 31.



# The Peruvian Communication Policies

The Peruvian military communication policies implemented between 1968 and 1980 are the reflection of changes that took place in other areas of economic, social, and cultural policies. Despite the fact that the military communication policies have been important to the Peruvian mass media, they have been the object of limited attention. The military regime's communication policies were important to the Peruvian mass media, because the 1968 government stimulated structural changes in the sector of mass media communications. Peruvian mass media were directly affected by the institutions (e.g., the Ministry of Communications, and the National Information System – SINADI) established by the 1968 Revolution, as well as by the regulations passed (e.g., Press and Telecommunications Law) during the military regime.

It can also be said that the military regime's communication policies were important because they were, at least apparently, consonant with General Velasco's socialist policies of nationalization and transfer of power in order to promote national development and full participation of the unintegrated majority of Peruvian population. By contrast, before the 1968 Revolution, communication policies were:

collection of unconnected dispositions many of which were mutually incompatible because the legislation was almost always in response to the exigencies of particular interests and not to a communications policy consonant with national interests and with the concepts of development planning.<sup>59</sup>

At this point, it is important to be said that, according to UNERSCO's definition, "a national communication policy is a set of prescriptions and

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<sup>59</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 35.

norms laid down to guide the behavior of communication institutions in a country”.<sup>60</sup>

Taking the above things into account, this section will briefly discuss some of the laws enacted by the revolutionary government. This chapter also describes some of the main institutions which were established by the military regime to regulate, operate, and/or create the basic infrastructure for the achievement of each one of the specific goals of the 1968 revolution. Therefore this chapter is divided in four subsections: 1) The Press Law; 2) The Ministry of Transport and Communications; 3) The General Telecommunications Law; and, 4) The national Information System – SINADI.

## THE PRESS LAW

The first Press Law of the Peruvian military regime was promulgated on December 30, 1969 (Decree Law n° 18075).<sup>61</sup> Its principal effect on the press was the limitation of freedom of expression in newspapers and magazines. That law stimulated the “self-censorship among editors and publishers.” Thomas E. Weil says that:

A “freedom of the press” statute articulated the intention of the government to establish the limits of publishable criticism or, in the words of President Velasco, to punish “reactionary papers which fill their papers with lies and insinuations.” The law stated that the only restrictions were “respect for the law, truth and morality, the demands of national security, and defense, and the safeguard of personal and family honor and privacy.”<sup>62</sup>

In addition, Weil says also that whatever articles were considered “abusive to the armed forces” were subject to censorship. As an example of this, he cites that Lima’s most popular magazine, *Caretas* “was seized and the

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 1977, p. 9. See also “Report of Meeting of Experts on Communication Policies and Planning in Latin America, Bogotá, 4-13 July, 1974”, UNESCO (COM/74/Conf.617/4).

<sup>61</sup> Peirano et al, 1976, p.XII

<sup>62</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p.214.

editor exiled” because it had printed the fact that the military people “had received a 30 percent pay increase while wages elsewhere were frozen.”<sup>63</sup>

Due to the Press Law of 1969, the Velasco’s regime underwent internal and external pressure: internally, from the economic elite, which was owner of mass media; externally, e.g., from the “Inter-American Press Association [IAPA]... an association of newspaper owners and editors, founded in 1926” , which has as one of its “principal activities... a yearly review of press freedom in Latin America”.<sup>64</sup> Replying to the IAPA criticism of the Press Law, General Velasco stated that:

The enactment of the Statute of Press Liberty is a sovereign act for which no Government has to give an explanation to a foreign organism, and even less to the Inter-American Press Association, given that this is an entity that defends the interests of companies, and not the genuine liberty of expression as this is considered by the popular classes of America.<sup>65</sup>

It can be assumed that by means of the 1969 Press Law the government tried to exert control on the press, stifling criticism. Through the 1974 Press Law, the government tried to shape Peruvian Press, opting for its socialization in order to fit with the new model of the Peruvian society.<sup>66</sup> The second Press Law of the military government was promulgated on July 26, 1974, by Decree Law n° 20680. According to Ortega and Romero, that new Press Law established two main points

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 1972, p. 214.

<sup>64</sup> Luis Ramiro Beltrán S., and Elizabeth Fox de Cardona, “Latin America and the United States: Flaws in the Free Flow of Information”, in *National Sovereignty and International Communication*, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, eds., New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1979, p.53.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 1979, p.53.

<sup>66</sup> In addition, it is important, at this point, to know what were Peruvian journalists’ and newspapers editors’ opinions regarding the 1974 Press Law. According to Rita Atwood (“Communication Research in Latin America: Cultural and Conceptual Dilemmas”, paper prepared for the Intercultural Division, International Communication Association Convention, Acapulco, Mexico, May 1980, p. 20), an American researcher “conduct a series of interviews with numerous journalists, newspaper editors, and press representatives from Peru in 1976 and 1977 in order to present their opinions regarding the Peruvian Press Law of 1974. The picture that emerges from the various comments of the actor-respondents is one of a media system dedicated to goals of national development and adhering to principles of educating and informing the public.”

(a)The expropriation of all newspapers with nation-wide circulation for reasons of public (social) utility and necessity; (b) the transfer within one year to be counted from the date of the Law, of the aforesaid newspapers to the organized sector of the population, 26 July 1975 being set as the final date for this transfer. At the time of concluding this manuscript [1977], the transfer has already been started with the election by the basic sectors of the population of the numbers of the civil associations with representatives on the directorates of the newspaper companies. The process of transfer will be completed when the managing editors of each of the daily newspapers with nation-wide circulation are elected by the mass of the association's members.<sup>67</sup>

Without any doubt, the military regime's communication policies in regard to newspaper had "imposed experimental methods which may indicate the need for later reorganization."<sup>68</sup> It is important to note that according to Helán Jaworski during the last 6 years (1974-1980), the eight daily Peruvian newspapers with nation-wide circulation had their ownership structure changed three times: "From private families to people's organizations"; "from a socialized press to State Control and back to the past". Jaworski (who himself participated in the Peruvian-press-experiment as manager of the *El Comercio*, between 1975 and 1976) provides us with his criticism regarding the Peruvian social experiment with newspapers. He says that:

The participation of the people in the press is possible and desirable. In the first place, certainly, there should be participation by the workers themselves. This should be, as it started to be in Peru, in the ownership, management and benefits of the enterprise. And not through shareholders, which allows constant manipulation of the capital

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<sup>67</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 31.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., 1977, p.33.

by the majority holders. There must be effective participation from the bottom in all the decisions which concern the public interest....Participation thereafter implies other things. It does not mean admission to an existing structure, but co-responsibility in its formulation.... Structural reform in the area of information cannot be taken in isolation. It has to fit into a receptive social setting. As has been shown, in Peru there was effective representative support for earlier reforms: on the land, in business, in education and advertising... Reform of information suggests something more than transforming the conditions of ownership and management. Thinking about Another Information and active participation by the people also means a change of mentality by the professionals.<sup>69</sup>

## **THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS**

According do Ortega and Romero<sup>70</sup>, the Ministry of Transport and Communications was created by Decree Law n°17271, on December 3, 1968. It was one of the first steps of the military government in order to establish a legal and administrative structure for the communications sectors. Ortega and Romero also say that following the creation of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the military government promulgated on 21 March 1969, the Organic Law of the Transport and Communications Sectors, creating the Directorate-General of Communications.<sup>71</sup> It was created in order to control the communications subsectors, such as : ENTEL-Peru (National Telecommunications Corporation of Peru), and INICTEL (National Telecommunications

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<sup>69</sup> Jaworski, 1979, p. 144.

<sup>70</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p.41.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 1977, p.42. See also Luis Rocca Tores, 1975, p. 64. It should be noted that Ortega and Romero (p.42) say that: "The Directorate-General of Communications has advisory organs and two subordinate directorates: The Directorate of Telegraphs and Postal Services and Directorate if Telecommunications Service."

Research and Training Institute). According to Ortega and Romero the ENTEL and INICTEL were created in order to

achieve the objectives of the nationalization the public telecommunications services [e.g., telephone services] and their consolidation into an efficient, dependable and economical system to be exclusive property of the State and to cover the entire national territory. [...] El Instituto Nacional de Investigación y Capacitación de las Telecomunicaciones [INICTEL ] was created with the following objectives: a) to carry out scientific and technical research in connection with telecommunications; b) to train the personnel of all technical levels who will be responsible for directing or handling all the services of telecommunications; c) to carry out technical studies in the telecommunications field for public or private bodies.<sup>72</sup>

The Directorate of Telecommunications is one of the regulatory agencies of the military government. It was “Responsible for the control and supervision of the telecommunications and broadcasting services and for granting permits and licenses for private radio broadcasting, amateur radio stations and special telecommunications services. It also administers and controls the use of the electro-magnetic spectrum in the country”.<sup>73</sup>

Thus, the creation of the Ministry of Transport and Communications was the first step of the Peruvian military government toward the creation of a legal and administrative structure for promoting the reform of the broadcasting sector. The second main step was the General Telecommunication Law, which will be discussed in the following subsection.

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<sup>72</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 43. See also Gargurevich, 1977, p. 126. Gargurevich says that ENTEL was created on November 7, 1969, to control the telephonic service, communications by satellite, telex network, etc. According to him, ENTEL was powerful since its creation.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., 1977, p. 42.

## **THE GENERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW**

The Peruvian Telecommunications Law (N° 19020) was promulgated on November 9, 1971, by President Juan Velasco Alvarado. With that law, the military regime introduced one of the most radical changes on the ownership structure of Peruvian broadcasting media. With the General Telecommunications Law the structure of the telecommunications services were placed “at the service of the socio-economic development of the country and thus helping to make possible the of structural changes being pursued by the Revolutionary Government”.<sup>74</sup> The Telecommunications Law established that the telecommunications services were “of public necessity, utility, and security, and of preferred national interest.”<sup>75</sup> With the announcement of the Telecommunications Law in November 1971:

It was officially announced that “radio transmission and communication services, for security and educational reasons, are under the control of the State.” The government revealed that it was assuming the option of expropriating 51 percent of the equity of any television stations and 25 percent of the equity of any radio stations.<sup>76</sup>

That law stated that “all stations would be required to allocate one hour per day to the government – at no cost – for dissemination of cultural and educational programs”.<sup>77</sup>

When the new law was enacted, there were exactly 19 television-stations (programming and repeaters) in the country, six in Lima and 13 in the provinces. In regard to radio stations, there were exactly 222 stations in the country, 35 in Lima and 187 in the provinces (See Table III). It is important to be said that under the new law “all stations were to be placed in ‘worker

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<sup>74</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 42.

<sup>75</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 156.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 1972, p. 215.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 1972,p. 172.

communities’, in which employees were to receive 25 percent of all profits in cash and stock each year and were to share in managing their stations”.<sup>78</sup>

During the introduction of the new law, General Antonio Meza Cuadra, Minister of Transport and Communications, presented a report in which he stated that 37 percent of the Peruvian television’s time was devoted to advertising.<sup>79</sup> Meza Cuadra described the television content in this way: “of 390 hours weekly, 16 were publicity. Against this 37 percent, we get 8 percent for cultural programs, 5 percent for news, 6 percent for sports and 44 percent covering television plays, serials, ... films, and live material”.<sup>80</sup>

Among other important points, some of which were presented and discussed in foregoing chapters, one can summarize the importance of the new law of telecommunications by saying that it was designed:

- a) To place broadcasting stations services (radio and TV-stations) under State control, therefore, creating “conditions that would result in dissemination of government-approved news and views to an unprecedented number of listeners throughout the country”<sup>81</sup>;
- b) To order the expropriation of 25 percent of equity of certain radio stations and 51 percent of the equity of certain TV-stations, transferring them into associated state enterprises<sup>82</sup>;
- c) To limit ownership and to establish that “all station owners and employees were to be Peruvian born, and foreign entertainers were to

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<sup>78</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 173.

<sup>79</sup> In regard to advertising, Beltrán and Fox de Cardona (1979, p. 37) say that: “Malpica (1968) reported that 80% of Peruvian commercial advertising was controlled by seven North American agencies. In 1969 in that country, Sears Roebuck and ‘Supermarkets’ occupied the first place in newspaper advertising while Procter and Gamble, Sears Roebuck, Sidney Ross, Colgate-Palmolive, Sherwin Williams, and Bayer were the top television and radio announcers”.

<sup>80</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 24. See also Weil ET AL, 1972, p. 173, where they say that: “The Minister of Transport and Communications said that the time used for commercials would be reduced, that the Peruvian content of all programming was to be raised from 36 percent to 60 percent, and that all advertising must be of Peruvian origin.”

<sup>81</sup> Weil ET AL, 1972, p. 168.

<sup>82</sup> According to Weil ET AL, 1972, pp. 156-172,: “On the day after the new law [Telecommunications] the government ordered expropriation of certain portions of the shares of more than a dozen radio and television enterprises... Those affected were : Empresa Radio Victoria, Radiodifusora Radio Reloj, Empresa Difusora Radio-Tele, Empresa Radio Difusora Excelsior, Radio Atalaya, Empresa radiodifusora Once Ochenta, Promotora Siglo Veinte, Radio El Cadena Nacional, Emisoras Populares, Emisoras Peruanas, Toledos, Paramericana de Televisión, Compania Peruana de Radiodifusión, and Radio Continental.

be allowed on programs ‘only at the convenience of the authorities’”<sup>83</sup>;

- d) To limit the number of foreign programs, stimulating the local production, emphasizing cultural issues. It can be recalled that, before the telecommunications law, the main Peruvian TV-stations had connections with American networks. As an example of this one claim that Panamerican Television (Channel 5) was linked to the Columbia Broadcasting System (CB); Channel 4 had connections with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC); and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) provided the remaining stations with films and serials without having direct economic connections <sup>84</sup>;
- e) To integrate the telecommunication services on the basis of the National Telecommunications Plan. This plan is a document which determines the general lines for the telecommunications services in Peru. The main objectives of this plan were: “a) to create a basic infrastructure which is of a technically adequate and dependable type and gives proper consideration to the economic aspects; b) to integrate the existing services into a national system; c) to facilitate public access to telecommunications and broadcasting services” <sup>85</sup>;
- f) To use the telecommunication services as a tool for promoting social and economic development<sup>86</sup>. In order to do that, the military regime created the National Information System (SINADI), which among other things should ensure that “publicity in the country is used congruently with the National Development Plan... and to serve towards the culture, education and recreation of the Peruvian citizen, to stimulate the development of his creative and critical capacities and to ensure his active participation in the information process”.<sup>87</sup>

The Peruvian National Information System (SINADI) will be discussed with more details in the following subsections.

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<sup>83</sup> Weil et al, 1972, p. 173.

<sup>84</sup> Gargurevich, 1977, pp. 160-162.

<sup>85</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 45.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 1977, p. 42. See also Weil ET AL, 1972, pp. 156-172; and Torres, 1975, pp.55-58.

<sup>87</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 43.

## NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEM (SINADI)

The Sistema Nacional de Información – SINADI (National Information System) was instituted by means of the Decree Law n° 20550 of March 5, 1974.<sup>88</sup> The SINADI has the status of Ministry and its chief has voice in the Council of Ministers<sup>89</sup>. With the creation of SINADI and its enterprises (See **FIGURE I**), the military regime provided “an adequate administrative framework for the reform of Peruvian broadcasting”<sup>90</sup>. According to Luis Peirano and colleagues, the creation of this system was one of the most important measures of the military government, because SINADI was created to “manage, supervise, control, advise, etc., everything related do radio, film, and printed publications”<sup>91</sup>. In addition, Ortega and Romero say that with the creation of SINADI,

the responsibilities of the Minister of Transport and Communications have become confined to the authorization of broadcasting services, with other administrative activities, and the planning of broadcasting systems. The system is responsible for the operation of the State radio and television stations and the supervision and quality control of publicity and programs put out by the broadcasting media.<sup>92</sup>

It should be noted that the Central Information Office (Oficina Central de Información – OCI) is the executive branch of the SINADI. In addition, the military government created five public enterprises (“Organismos Públicos Descentralizados”) in order that the functions of the SINADI/OCI be accomplished.<sup>93</sup> The five public enterprises are:

- 1) The Cinematography Enterprise (CINE-Peru – Empresa de Cibematografía);
- 2) Publishing House Enterprise (Editora-Peru – Empresa Editorial);
- 3) National Advertising Corporation (PUBLI-Peru – Agencia de Publicidad del Estado);

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<sup>88</sup> Peirano et al, 1976, pp. XIII-XIV.

<sup>89</sup> Torres, 1975, pp. 67-68. See also Peirano et al, 1976, p.XIII.

<sup>90</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 50.

<sup>91</sup> Peirano et al, 1975, p. XIII. See also Torres, 1975, pp. 67-68.

<sup>92</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 43.

<sup>93</sup> Torres, 1975, pp. 67-69.

- 4) National News Service (ESI-Peru – Empresa de Servicio de Informaciones); and,
- 5) National Broadcasting Corporation of Peru (ENRAD-Peru – Empresa Nacional de Radiodifusión de Peru).

Summarizing, the activities of the five enterprises were: CINE-Peru was created to produce the official newsreels of the government, as well as to promote all cinematographic activities of the State. EDI-Peru, the official publishing house, was created not only to be responsible for the printing and circulation of newspaper such as *El Peruano*, *La Cronica*, *La Tercera de La Cronica*, but also to publish books and printed-matter, and to control the Editora Virú, which was responsible for the printing of *La Cronica*. PUBLI-Peru was created to centralize, to control, and to produce all advertising campaigns of the public sectors and of all the other branches of the Peruvian government.<sup>94</sup> It must be said that by 1974 the State was one of the main advertisers of the country, as PUBLI-Peru was controlling the advertising in the Peruvian mass media (See **TABLE V**, which shows the growth of advertising expenditure in Peru).

**TABLE V**  
**GROWTH OF ADVERTISING**  
**EXPENDTURE IN PERU**

Year	US\$ Millions
1960	19.0
1968	33.6
1970	41.3
1974	59.5
1976	94.8


Sources: Starch, INRA, Hooper and International Advertising Association, Advertising Expenditure Around the World, various annual reports.

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<sup>94</sup> Gargurevich, 1977, p. 185. See also Torres, 1975, p. 69.

**FIGURE I**

**The organization of the Ministry  
of Communications and SINADI**



The Empresa Nacional de Radiodifusión – ENRAD-Peru (National Broadcasting Corporation) was created on December 17<sup>th</sup>, 1974, in order to

Market both domestically and abroad its own programs and those produced by enterprises in which the State participates and to import and to distribute in Peru on exclusive basis foreign radio and television programs. With the creation of ENRAD-Peru, the National Broadcasting System which is to cover the entire country has begun to function.<sup>95</sup>

According to Katz and Wedell, that ENRAD-Peru was also instituted to operate the State network of radio stations. By that time, the network was composed of 32 radio stations.<sup>96</sup> According to Ortega and Romero, by 1977 it was easy to verify some of the changes occurred due to the creation of ENRAD-Peru. They pointed out changes such as: “a) the percentage allocated to publicity has been reduced; b) publicity has largely been adjusted to the standards set for it; c) the number of sports, culture, news and discussion programmes has been increased; d) the percentages of y produced programmes have been increased”.<sup>97</sup>

The Empresa Publica de Servicio de Informaciones – ESI-Peru (The National Information Service) – was created on June 10<sup>th</sup>, 1975. According to the Decree-Law n° 21173, as quoted by Torres<sup>98</sup>, the ESI-Peru was created, among other things, in order to fulfill the following functions:

- a) To collect, process, and transmit all kinds of information derived from the State and its branches inside or outside of the country;
- b) To plan and conduct all informative campaigns which can be required by the National Public Sector and/or by others institutions;
- c) To produce press-releases to the media communications;
- d) To produce technical training of personnel;
- e) To investigate, promote, and support the use of new technologies and services in order to use them for developing its own activities.

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<sup>95</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p.44

<sup>96</sup> Katz and Wedell, 1977, p. 75

<sup>97</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 44.

<sup>98</sup> Torres, 1975, pp. 72-73).

In short, the national Information Services was created to be

responsible for new coverage both at the national level (ESI-Peru) and at the regional level (ESI-Andina), with prospects of integration with similar agencies of the Andean sub-region, the Latin American region and, in the future, with other regions of the Third World, especially those linked to the group of non-Aligned countries.<sup>99</sup>

As has been shown, throughout foregoing sections and subsections, the Peruvian military regime assumed its normative and regulatory function in regard to mass media, formulating a Peruvian Communication Policy. In short, one can state that the Peruvian military communication policy was a reflection of the radical changes that occurred in Peru between 1968 and 1980, when the government adopted a national plan which postulated a model of social and economic development with full social participation. To sum up, one can say that before the 1968 revolution, there was not only a lack of specific legislation on telecommunications, but also a lack of administrative framework. With the promulgation of its laws and creation of official bodies such as the Ministry of Transport and Communication, SINADI, etc., the military government provided the Peruvian mass media with a preliminary infrastructure.

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<sup>99</sup> Ortega and Romero, 1977, p. 67.

## Discussion and Suggestions

This study is a preliminary effort toward the goal of examining some aspects of the development of communication policies under the Peruvian military government. Throughout this book the reader can verify the efforts of the Peruvian military regime to create its own mass media communication model, which was an attempt to reject the model transferred and developed before the 1968 Revolution.

Due to the study's scope, there is no analysis of the influence exerted by external economic and cultural groups, the influence of advertising on the growth of mass media, or how these factors contributed to the measures which were adopted by military government. However, it can be stated that what happened with mass media communications between 1968 and 1980 in Peru was a direct consequence of the political, social, and economic situation of the country. To reduce inequalities the military regime had pursued a policy of harnessing mass media to promote its new economic, social, and cultural order.

Assuming that communication policies complement or are complemented by those policies formulated in other social, cultural, political and economic field, one can conclude that the military regime's communication policies reflect the changes that took place in the Peruvian society as a whole. In addition, it can be said that to understand better the Peruvian military's social experience with mass media, it is useful not only to look at the goals of 1968 Revolution, because there is a close relationship among State, National Security, and centralization of the mass media, but also to look at all the other sectors of the Peruvian society, because "the design, implementation, and effects of national communication policies (or absence of such policies is better comprehended when mass communication variables are studied within the domestic and international economic, political and cultural context".<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Jorge A. Schinitman, "Economic Protectionism and Mass Media development: Film Industry in Argentina", in *Communication and Social Structure*, Emile McAnany, ET AL, Eds.,

It should be recalled that the most important reforms on the field of mass media were promoted during General Velasco's (1968-1975) term in office, when policies for popular participation were promulgated, regulating among other things ownership of the media. In promoting so much reform by means of the adoption of a national plan in which both communist and capitalist systems were rejected, Velasco's socialist but non-marxist government faced strong opposition. The concentration of ownership of the media and their utilization by the oligarchic interests were two of the major obstacles to the social reforms of the military regime, which was facing some problems:

Among all the problems, one in particular stood out as very serious. The revolution had opened many fronts (too few for some, too many for others) but had no one to defend it. In simplest theoretical outline its support was the coupling: people – armed forces. But the armed forces as an institution could not enter into the political arena, they had a strictly hierarchical organization; and – more serious, the attacks against the reforms (which affected the middle classes, from which officialdom was recruited) also began to make an impression at the level of ministers, who disagreed with and contradicted each other. In their turn the organizations of the people, which were a product of the revolution, protested, opposed or supported, but were ignored by the mass media, by television, radio and the main daily newspapers (main not for readership reasons, but for having been traditionally the opinion-makers). If the majority had no way of expressing themselves, the minority by contrast made themselves heard in an opposition that reached excessive proportions because of its control of the media. It was obvious that nothing was lost by inverting the terms.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Jaworski, 1979, p. 122.

Thus, when General Velasco was replaced by General Morales Bermudez as President of the country on August 29, 1975, Peruvian mass media were under State control. That is: the newspapers with nation-wide circulation had been expropriated (1974) and their directors were being appointed by the Central Information Office (OCI). The State was also operating radio stations through ENRAD-Peru, which was dependent of the OCI. The Government had also control of 51 percent of the shares of Peruvian television stations and 25 percent of the shares of certain radio stations. The State was also the main advertiser of the country, and the PUBLI-Peru was controlling the advertising in the Peruvian media.

It should be noted that in August of 1975, in the same week in which General Velasco was replaced by General Morales Bermudez as President of the country, SINADI was promoting a seminar to evaluate the changes promoted by the government on the mass media sectors. That seminar was entitled “Toward a new Peruvian Broadcasting” (Hacia la nueva radiodifusión Peruana) and its conclusions were never adopted due to the structural and political changes occurred in the government. According to Juan Gargurevich, that seminar had suggested among other things:

- a) A reduction of the number of hours of transmission of both radio and TV;
- b) The creation of an office of investigation of the effects of mass media, which should constantly promote research and evaluation of the communication system;
- c) The elaboration of a study in order to verify the possibility to create a mix-system in order to give economic support to radio and TV stations, avoiding their dependency on advertising; and,
- d) The creation of the Institute of Social Communication to prepare the professionals of mass media.<sup>102</sup>

Thus the sudden change of presidents, when the social experience with mass media was still being implemented, contributed to weakening the mass media reform. As an example of this, one can say that it was also during General Morales Bermudez’s term in office (1975-1980), to be more exact between March 1976 and July 1978, that the social experiment of popular participation in the ownership and co-management of newspapers

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<sup>102</sup> Gargurevich, 1977, pp. 185-186.

began to fail because that participation first decreased and later disappeared due to the almost total State control. As Helán Jaworski has observed:

[...] the Central Office of Information acquires greater influence: it supplies news to the dailies, suggests newspaper policy, organizes campaigns that are reproduced almost identically in different dailies, and in addition provides editorial columns. At this stage [from March 1976 to July 1978] the press is dominated by the State and all participation disappears [...] Without giving up its control over the news via the Central Office of Information, the Government has set up [...] a new transitional ownership and administration structure, handing over these faculties to a new management committee, this time made up of technicians presided over by a representative of the Development Finance Corporation.<sup>103</sup>

Therefore, one can conclude that Peruvian social experience with mass media can be considered a success if one considers that one of the major reasons for government intervention was to stifle criticism. By contrast, the social experiment with mass media can be considered a failure because “the real transfer of power”, as proposed by the military government in order to implement a “social democracy of full participation”, was not completed as has been mentioned in this study, and as a result, the expropriated newspapers were returned to their former owners (See **TABLE VI** in order to know some of the successes and failures of the social experiment with mass media).

It should be noted that it is still unclear whether the Peruvian military regime’s policies (including communication policies) failed in fostering national culture. It may yet be too early to tell, principally for lack of empirical data, but the military regime had directly and indirectly contributed to develop among Peruvians a national spirit directed toward

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<sup>103</sup> Jaworski, 1979, p. 125.

the preservation of cultural values, such as the preservation of Peruvian traditional music.<sup>104</sup>

The military regime's communication policies were important to the Peruvian mass media, because they stimulated structural changes in the ownership of mass media, and because before 1968 there was no collection of laws which were consonant with national interests, but only ones which promoted the private interests of the owners of the media.

Peruvian mass media were directly affected by regulations passed during the military regime, as well as by the institutions (e.g., the Ministry of Transport and Communications, SINADI, OCI, ESI-Peru, ENRAD-Peru) established by the 1968 Revolution. However, everything can be changed during the present Fernando Belaúnde Terry's<sup>105</sup> term in office because a study is being done on the sector of Peruvian Public Enterprises in which SINADI's enterprises are included as well as the TV and radio stations in which the government holds shares. It should be noted that:

One of Pres. Belaúnde's first acts [upon his return to the Presidency] was to cope with the disturbing question of the press, repressed during the military period. Belaúnde returned the newspapers to their former owners... an act which apparently strengthened the impression of his tolerant policies.<sup>106</sup>

Despite much scrutiny, the Peruvian military's model of communication still needs a considerable amount of empirical analysis in order to verify describe and explain both the macro and micro levels of why, where, and how the social experience with mass media succeed or failed. More research is need principally on the structure and effects of the Peruvian military regime's communication policies in order to provide us with new insights for further communication research development not only in Peru, but also in other Latin American countries under military governments.

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<sup>104</sup> In a personal interview with this author, Professor Alfred Saulniers, the University of Texas at Austin, who has recently been in Peru (1981), said that now there are very few sores specializing in song that does not provide albums of the traditional Peruvian music. Which was not the case before 1968.

<sup>105</sup> In May 1980, Fernando Belaúnde Terry won the elections with a large majority and returned to power and fulfill the mandate period 1980-1985.

<sup>106</sup> "Pres. Belaúnde Take Office", in *Hemispherica*, Vol. XXIX, n° 6, June-July, 1989, p. 3.

Considering that debates are expected to continue, such questions as the following deserve intensive and critical research in the future:

- 1) How did the popular participation in the ownership and co-management of newspapers work?
- 2) How did the economic constraints affect the changes promoted by military regime?
- 3) How did the Peruvian system of communication work from 1974 to 1980? What were the effects of the laws during that period?
- 4) Are there any lasting changes despite the reversion of the ownership of the newspapers to the private sector?
- 5) Does the socialization experience of the media in Peru monolithically failed? Where and when the plan of the military regime failed or succeeded?
- 6) Did the military regime increase investments in communication industries? Has that level of investment been maintained under private ownership?

**TABLE VI**  
**SOME OF THE FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF**  
**THE MILITARY'S COMMUNICATION POLICIES**  
**(1968-1980)**

FAILURES	SUCCESSES
1- It failed to keep the press in the hands of representatives organizations of the new Peruvian society.	1- It established a guiding State policy to mass media, at the same time it created an administrative framework for the communication sector.
2- It failed to reach an authentically free press, ensuring free expression of ideas.	2- It reduced the time percentage allocated to advertising and as a result there were an increase in the number of sports, cultural news, and discussion programs.
3- It failed to promote the decentralization of broadcasting stations throughout Peruvian country	3- It eliminate/reduced the ownership concentration in the hands of a few groups, at the same time that it reserved the ownership of mass media only for Peruvian born.
4- It failed to produce 60 percent of radio and TV broadcasting programs in the country	4- It stifled criticism and put mass media services under State control.
5- It failed to change the TV content, which continued to show foreign programs	5- It nationalized the telecommunications services, integrating the existent services into a national system.
6- It failed to change the capitalist Characteristic of the mass media	

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## About the author

Sérgio Augusto Soares Mattos was born in Brazil. He is on leave as an assistant professor at the Department of Communication at the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA). He used to be a daily newspaper editor in Salvador until 1978 when he came to the United States to complete his higher education. He has published several papers and reports on Brazilian mass media, and presented some papers on mass media in Latin America. Mattos is also the author of several poetry books, including two which were translated to English: *Time's Sentinel* (1979), and *I no Longer Sing, I Cry* (1980).

Sérgio Mattos received his Bachelor's degree in Journalism from the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA) in 1971; and his Master's degree in Communication from the Department of Radio-Television-Film, at the University of Texas at Austin, in 1980, with a thesis on "The Impact of Brazilian Military Government on the Development of Television in Brazil." Presently, he is a doctoral student in the College of Communication, University of Texas, at Austin. His areas of interest focus on International Communications issues, Communication Policies, the dependency of Latin American mass media on multinational advertising, and on imported software and hardware from developed countries.